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Prior researchers (Anderson et al. 1994; Ballard & Johnson 2004; Hoag &
Benedict 2010) have shown that different math abilities do not equally correlate with
success in economics, yet no research has specifically compared algebra and geometry
skills as predictors of economics success. In the first essay, I find that students’
standardized geometry scores are a much greater predictor of success in economics than
standardized algebra test scores. The study uses a rich data set that includes all Georgia
public high school students who took a mandatory economics course in 2006, 2007, or
2008. Results from this study provide supporting evidence that utilizing a generic math
proxy is probably unwise for researchers modeling economics success. These findings
can also be used to strengthen recruitment efforts since geometry scores seem to be a
strong predictor of economics aptitude. Although causality cannot be inferred from my
findings, it is plausible that a mandatory geometry course prior to economics would
improve student outcomes in economics.
In the second essay, I analyze the relationship between economics education and
macroeconomic policy attitudes of the general public following the financial crisis of

2008. Using survey data of all 50 states, I find that economics literacy is correlated with
preferences for three of the six policies preferences studied. Specifically, economics
literacy is positively correlated with support for decreased taxes and a smaller
government, and negatively correlated with supporting a ceiling on CEO salaries.
Additionally, the completion of college and high school economics is positively
associated with supporting a decreased role of government. While prior researchers
(Roos 2007; Walstad 1997) found that economics literacy can influence policy
preferences, there have been no prior studies, to my knowledge, that analyzed the effects
of economics knowledge and economics course-taking on policy preferences within the
same dataset. My results show that economics literacy and course-taking exert
independent effects on macroeconomic preferences for some policies. Thus, any
researcher predicting economic preferences should consider controlling for these
economics literacy and economics course-taking variables. Furthermore, my findings
suggest that the advancing prevalence of economics education could lead to a shift in
public preferences.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Researchers in the field of economic education seem to gravitate towards two
basic research studies. The first type of study analyzes the determinants of student
success in economics courses. Examples of research in this field include studies of
classroom structure (e.g. experiential vs. lectures), the implementation of technology, and
the benefits of prerequisites. The second category of economic education research
analyzes the long-term repercussions of economic education. Do students retain
economics knowledge? Do former economics students behave differently than similar
individuals who did not take economics? This dissertation includes two essays, one from
each of these subfields of economics education research.
The first essay analyzes the preparatory value of algebra and geometry for high
school economics students. I find that a student’s success on a standardized economics
assessment is more highly correlated with geometry test scores than algebra scores.
There are reasons to suspect that this study will be well-received by the economic
education community. Firstly, the study uses a rich set of data of over 200,000 Georgia
high school students, which adds validity to the study. Secondly, the research could have
major consequences on course-sequencing since it appears that geometry skills strongly
predict success in economics. In addition, these results can be used to strengthen
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econometric models—clearly, my results show economic education researchers need to
take more care in creating proxies for math abilities. The most encouraging aspect of this
research is its uniqueness. Simply put, no researcher has thoroughly investigated the
benefits of different math skills for high school students.
The second essay inspects the macroeconomic preferences during the recent
“Great Recession.” Survey respondents were asked whether certain policies would have
helped solve the financial crisis. Do economically literate individuals possess
macroeconomics beliefs that differ from other persons? I find mixed results—economics
literacy correlates with preferences in three of the six cases analyzed. This contrasts with
the findings by Bill Walstad (1997), which indicated that economics literacy consistently
correlated with macroeconomics preferences in 1992. I also analyze the effects of
economics course-taking in college and high school, which are found relevant in two and
one of six policies, respectively, even when controlling for economics literacy. This
suggests that economics course-taking and economics literacy exert unique effects on
perceptions of the macroeconomy. These results will help economic education
researchers improve the understanding of economics knowledge, which will strengthen
economic education models.
These essays may prove valuable to economic educators and encourage further
research on these topics, for which prior research is sparse. The two essays of my
dissertation are presented separately in the following pages.

2

1.1 References
Walstad, William B. 1997. The effect of economics knowledge on public opinion of
economic issues. Journal of Economic Education 28, no. 3: 195-205.
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CHAPTER II
DO ALGEBRA AND GEOMETRY PROVIDE THE SAME VALUE IN PREPARING
STUDENTS FOR HIGH SCHOOL ECONOMICS?

2.1 Introduction
Research indicates that a strong ability in mathematics correlates with aptitude in
economics (Clark et al. 2011; Hoag & Benedict 2010; Ballard & Johnson 2004). There
are two potential explanations for this relationship. One possibility is that performance in
mathematics is correlated with unobserved latent variables; for example, students
demonstrating high marks in mathematics may be hard workers or the children of highly
motivational parents. This effect is indirect; math scores signal an innate ability that may
transfer to any discipline, including economics, but mathematical prowess of this nature
does not cause economics aptitude. High math ability may also have a direct effect on
one’s aptitude in economics; in other words, the relationship could be causal (Hoag &
Benedict 2010). A student with a solid mathematical background may be able to
problem-solve more easily and make quicker calculations. For example, a calculation of
consumer surplus for a linear demand curve requires students to calculate the area of a
triangle. Students with knowledge of geometry will have likely mastered such a
calculation, allowing them to focus on the theory, rather than learning a new formula.

4

It seems possible that some math abilities are more likely to have a direct effect
on a student’s potential in economics than others.1 For example, a student receiving high
marks on an assessment concerning imaginary numbers will likely attain high economics
test scores due to indirect effects (more educated parents, dedication to school, etc.).
However, a student showing proficiency in graphical tasks will likely succeed in an
economics course due to indirect and direct effects (correlation captures causality and
non-causality).
In this essay, I empirically investigate the effects of algebra and geometry
performance on economics performance. The data come from the state of Georgia and
include all public high school students who completed an economics course in 2006,
2007, and 2008. Performance in each subject (algebra I, geometry, and economics) is
proxied by scores on End-of-Course-Tests (EOCT), which are high-stakes exams taken at
the end of each course. While many researchers have found a positive correlation
between performance in math classes and economics, very few have analyzed the
potential differences among different math courses in predicting economics performance.
Compared to algebra EOCT scores, I find that geometry EOCT scores are
statistically more strongly correlated with economics EOCT performance. These results
could be used when considering course sequencing—student performance may improve
if geometry is taken prior to economics. Unfortunately, more research is needed to
establish any degree of causality between geometry and economics abilities. Economics
educators can also use this finding to strengthen student placement and improve
recruiting efforts by using geometry performance as a predictor of success in economics.
1

Hoag and Benedict (2010) and Ballard and Johnson (2004) both report some evidence of this position.
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Furthermore, this essay should improve the understanding of econometric methods in
economic education research. Finally, these results indicate that the employment of
generic math proxies in models predicting success in economics may lead to biased
results since algebra and geometry skills do not equally correlate with economics
aptitude.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Does high school economics matter?
Before delving into the literature on the effects of math ability on economics
aptitude, it is important to understand the benefits (if any) of high school economics.
Two recent studies (Mandell & Klein 2009; Shipley & Shetty 2008) do not find that high
school economics or personal finance courses provide lasting positive effects for
students. For two years, Shipley and Shetty (2008) assessed economics knowledge of
students at Henderson State University (a four-year liberal arts college in Arkansas)
before enrolling in Principles of Microeconomics or Macroeconomics. Among these
students, Test of Economic Literacy (TEL) scores did not differ between students who
had completed a high school economics course and those who did not. Likewise,
Mandell and Klein (2009) find that high school personal finance courses have no effect
on financial literacy five years after high school graduation. As with many studies, there
are some data collection problems that could be driving these results—for example,
students were provided no explicit incentive to exert effort on the TEL in the Shipley and
Shetty (2008) study. Even so, the findings in these two papers introduce the possibility

6

that high school economics and personal finance training is not improving knowledge or
behavior.
The findings provided by Shipley and Shetty (2008) and Mandell and Klein
(2009) run contrary to the results of comprehensive, standardized exams, which indicate
that 12th grade economics students are gaining a solid grasp of the subject. Eighty-two
percent of individuals in a nationally representative sample demonstrate at least a basic
understanding of the subject (National Center for Education Statistics 2013).
Comparatively, students from other disciplines possess at least a basic understanding less
frequently--65% in civics, 70% in geography, and 45% in history.2
Many researchers have found that high school economics can improve a student’s
economic literacy. Myatt and Waddell (1990) track a large group of students from one
high school that attended the same university and find that students who had taken a high
school economics course receive higher grades in a collegiate principles of economics
class than those with no high school economics training even after controlling for a host
of student variables (gender, age, math and English grades, etc.) and the style of
principles of economics class (instructor, class size, and method of delivery). The
authors also include two proxies for student attitude towards economics—number of
subsequent hours completed in college economics and a dummy variable if economics
was mandated by the student’s field of study. These proxies for attitude mitigate the selfselection issues, but there is still some concern that students who have taken high school
economics are systematically different than other students.

2

These results are presented in the three reports by the National Center for Education Statistics (National
Center for Education Statistics 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).
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Lopus (1997) reports additional evidence for the importance of high school
economics. Studying results on the 1989-1990 Test of Understanding College
Economics (TUCE), Lopus categorizes college students into two groups—(1) students
who had taken an economics course in high school with a duration exceeding one
semester that included an emphasis on macroeconomics or microeconomics and (2)
students who either did not complete a full semester of economics or took an economics
course that did not explicitly emphasize macroeconomics or microeconomics. She finds
that students in group 1 entered college economics with a higher macroeconomics
knowledge than students in group 2. Even after taking Microeconomics in college,
students who completed Microeconomics in high school showed a higher
microeconomics ability level, which may indicate that high school economics can have
long-lasting effects on economics knowledge. However, following a college
macroeconomics class, there is no statistical difference between students who completed
high school macroeconomics and those who did not. As with the Myatt and Wadell
(1990) study, self-selection may be an issue. However, high school economics was a
mandatory portion of state curriculums in 15 states at the time of data collection (Walstad
2002, p. 196), which subdues, but does not eliminate, self-selection bias. Studies from
the late 1960s and 1970s (such as Moyer & Paden 1968; Lewis, et al. 1973; and Palmer et
al. 1979) report similar findings—high school economics students tend to outperform
college students who did not take economics.
High school economics is generally found to improve economics knowledge and
22 states currently require that high school students take an economics course (Survey of
the States 2012, p. 1). Therefore, it is a worthwhile to take on the task of finding the
8

determinants of student success. In doing so, it may be possible to improve student
preparedness for high school economics and, in turn, enhance economic knowledge.
2.2.2 Math and economics
Many studies that examine education outcomes in economics use a generic math
variable, such as SAT math score or a grade in one course, to account for math aptitude.
Typically, the math variable is found to be positively correlated with performance in an
economics course or assessment. The magnitude and interpretation of the coefficient for
math is often ignored. These studies—which assume that all math abilities correlate with
economics aptitude equally—do not provide adequate evidence of a positive correlation.
The math variable may simply account for effort or overall intelligence. Research
described in the remainder of this section is specifically aimed at finding the relevance
and robustness of math abilities net of other relevant variables in determining students’
economics performance.
Hoag and Benedict (2010) collected grades from fall principles of
microeconomics courses between 2002 and 2006 at Bowling Green State University.
After omitting individuals who had transferred to Bowling Green or were missing ACT
scores, the authors find that performance on the math section of the ACT is significantly
and positively related to performance in the introductory college economics course after
controlling for other measures of student ability.3
Myatt and Waddell (1990) corroborate these findings. They track the
matriculation of students from one high school to a small university on the Atlantic Coast
3

The authors did not include scores on the verbal section of the ACT.
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over a nine-year period. The authors were able to gather some information about the
students’ high school performance, including grades for 12th grade English and 11th grade
math. Additionally, a dummy variable was provided for students who completed an
optional math course in the 12th grade. During the 12th grade, students were also given
the option to take economics; grade earned serves as the dependent variable. The authors
also created a proxy for attitude towards economics based on the number of collegiate
hours of economics taken after principles and whether economics was a compulsory part
of a student’s program of study. All students in the data set matriculated to the same
university and eventually took principles of economics. Among all students sampled,
achievement in 11th grade math and enrollment in 12th grade math are each positively
correlated with final grades in an economics principles course.4 A dummy variable for
high school math is also significant, providing additional evidence that students retain
knowledge from high school economics. However, when a regression is run that only
includes students who had taken economics in high school, the effects of math enrollment
and performance are less robust: The coefficient for 11th grade math falls by 72% but
remains significant and enrollment in 12th grade math is no longer a significant variable.
The authors take this as evidence that high school math ability and the completion of high
school economics are substitutes. However, as the author’s briefly mention, the inclusion
of a high school economics grade in the regression may cause multicollinearity problems
since high school math and economics grades are highly correlated. Also, the sample
size is much smaller in this regression—lessening the likelihood of finding statistical
significance. In a regression with an even smaller sample size, high school math is the
4

th

th

The authors are unable to gather data on 12 grade math performance. 12 grade math is not
th
compulsory—a positive sign is an indication that high aptitude students are more likely to take 12 grade
math.
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only variable found to significantly correlate with final grade in Intermediate
Macroeconomics.
Arnold and Straten (2012) analyze data from college students in The Netherlands
and find that a student’s overall high school math performance is positively related to
performance in economics. Similar to Myatt and Waddel (2010), the authors seek to
control for motivation in an effort to reduce self-selection bias. The authors run a factor
analysis based on responses to a series of survey questions and reduce the results to four
categories. For example, the “extrinsic motivation” category is based on responses to job
prospects and personal development—both of which will likely encourage a student to
attain higher grades, while the “intrinsic motivation” is largely composed of questions
gauging a student’s interest in economics and math.5 Even after controlling for
motivation, high school track, high school GPA, and other relevant variables, the results
corroborate with Hoag and Benedict (2010): Math ability and performance in economics
are positively related. Interestingly, the authors also discover that intrinsic motivation is
of utmost importance for students who lack a strong analytical background.
Using a method very similar to those described above, Cohn et al. (1998) do not
find that math skills are necessarily important for economics success. Principles of
economics students were asked to complete a 30-question math quiz prior to taking
economics. After controlling for similar variables as the authors above (e.g. SAT, GPA,
etc.), the authors find that the math quiz score is not significantly related to grade earned
in the principles of economics class. Also, the completion of college calculus was found

5

There are obvious flaws to these measures of motivation. Nevertheless, the authors’ methods should
improve the study’s reliability.
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to be unrelated. However, the authors do find that students who consider graphs helpful
in learning are more likely to succeed in economics. This indicates that math exposure or
attitude towards geometrical tasks may still correlate with economics performance,
although the effect is probably indirect. This study indicates that research does not
unambiguously support a strong connection between math and economics performance.
However, the reliability of these results is questionable due to the small sample sizes
(between 88 and 126 students per regression).
The literature discussed thus far has only focused on the effect of math on
economics ability without entertaining the possibility that math ability is not effective
preparation for all economic concepts and learning styles. In a study of 3,000 British
college students, Lumsden and Scott (1987) find that high-achieving math students
perform better than medium and low achieving math students on multiple choice
economics exam questions. However, the authors report no such relationship for essay
questions. In fact, there is a negative, albeit insignificant, relationship between
achievement in math and performance on microeconomics and macroeconomics essay
portions of exams. Similarly, Williams et al. (1992) show that scores on the math section
of the SAT are positively correlated with grades on multiple choice and numerical/spatial
questions in a principles of economics course, but not significantly related to
performance on essay questions. These studies illustrate that math may not always lead
to high-achievement in economics and that the style of exam questions may understate or
overstate the importance of math in relation to economics performance.
Math ability and economics performance are generally found to be positively
related. However, it is possible that some math abilities are more highly correlated with
12

economics performance than others. Butler et al. (1998) find that the level of calculus
attained and subsequent calculus grades are, for the most part, positively related to
performance in the Intermediate Microeconomic Theory class. This is of little surprise,
since Calculus students are often high achieving students in general. However, calculus
class-taking and calculus grades are not found to correlate with performance in
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory. This is an important discovery and indicates that
math knowledge may not unilaterally improve the odds of succeeding in economics
courses.
Anderson et al. (1994) also find that the completion of calculus may influence a
student’s performance in economics. The authors track students who enroll in
Introductory Economics at the University of Toronto after graduating from high schools
in Ontario. Introductory Economics course spans two semesters and includes topics in
both microeconomics and macroeconomics. They find that, among high school course
grades, calculus grade is the strongest predictor of final grade in the course—even
stronger than high school economics. Next, the authors include a dummy variable for
taking high school calculus (along with other relevant variables) and find that it
positively correlates with college students’ grades in economics. Then, the authors run a
regression including both the dummy variable for calculus and also grade in calculus. In
this regression, the coefficient for the dummy variable is no longer significant (and is
actually negative). This suggests that it is knowledge of calculus that improves
economics performance, rather than exposure. The authors do not find a statistically
significant coefficient for performance in high school Algebra or Functions and
Relations. Interestingly, the authors find that English grade is negatively related to
13

collegiate economics grade. This finding sharply contrasts with Myatt and Waddell
(1990), who find that high school English aptitude is perhaps a stronger predictor of
college economics grade than math. Butler et al. (1998) and Anderson et al. (1994)
provide some evidence that all math abilities do not correlate with economics
performance equally.
Hoag and Benedict (2010) provide the most thorough investigation. To gain a
grasp on specific math abilities, Hoag and Benedict (2010) use performance on the three
components of the math ACT for students at Bowling Green State University. Each of
these components aimed to target the proficiency of students for specific tasks:6
1. Elementary Algebra: Basic operations, factoring, linear equations.
2. Algebra and Coordinate Geometry: Functions, exponents, arithmetic and
geometric series, matrices, complex numbers.
3. Plane Geometry and Trigonometry: Circles, rectangles, area, triangles,
trigonometry equations (Hoag & Benedict 2010, p. 26).
Scores on these three components serve as the only measure of aptitude in specific math
sub-disciplines. The math department at Bowling Green conducts mathematical
assessments in order to more accurately align incoming students with their first collegiate
math course. Based on math courses completed during high school, students choose a
math exam to complete, which determines college math placement. The
content/difficulty of the assessment chosen, and the subsequent score, determine the
highest level math class a student may take in his or her first college course.
6

Since this study, the ACT math section has been altered so that the three components are PreAlgebra/Elementary Algebra, Intermediate Algebra/Coordinate Geometry, and Plane
Geometry/Trigonometry (actstudent.org).
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Unfortunately, the authors do not have access to the specific assessment chosen or the
scores attained. However, they do have data for the highest placing class a student could
choose to take. These six courses ranked from least to most selective are College
Algebra I, College Algebra II, Pre-Calculus, Basic Calculus (Business), Precalculus for
Higher Level Math, and Calculus/Trigonometry. This serves as an additional proxy for
mathematical ability, but does not capture the benefits of specific types of maths.7 As a
third measure of math ability, the authors provide the highest level of mathematics
completed prior to the student’s enrollment in principles of microeconomics.
The authors create five different ordered probit regressions. The dependent
variable is the final grade in Principles of Microeconomics, ranked from zero (final grade
of “F”) to four (final grade of “A”). When other math controls are excluded, each of the
three ACT math subscores is positively related to economics grade. However, in
regressions that include freshman math placement and highest level of college math,
score on the “Algebra and Coordinate Geometry” section of the ACT loses its
significance. In each case, the score on the “Plane Geometry and Trigonometry”
subsection is nominally more highly correlated with the economics score than the other
two math ACT subsections—however, the authors do test if these correlations are
statistically different. The marginal effects reveal that the overall magnitude for each of
these scores is quite low compared to other relevant variables. Nonetheless, the extent of
7

While not discussed in the paper, it is quite possible that the level of placement is determined by more
than just math ability. For example, a mathematically-skilled student may choose to forego the most
difficult exam if he or she does not intend to major in math. Additionally, the selection of exam was not
completely determined by a student—for example, the most challenging exam required that students had
completed some trigonometry in high school. Again, this could have truncated the number of students
allowed to take the upper-level math courses: Even a perfect score on the two easier exams would not
allow a student to take, for example, Calculus and Analytical Geometry. For these reasons, this proxy of
math ability may not be reliable.
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controls for ability and effort—high school GPA, college GPA, dummy variable for
economics/finance major—increase the degree of variation in grades explained by the
model.8 The authors conclude from these results that math performance is a good
predictor of success in introductory economics courses. However, they argue that much
of this correlation is due to exposure to different mathematical ideas rather than from the
ability to solve problems. The authors reason that the abstract nature of trigonometry and
geometry “seems to prepare the students most” for economics (Hoag & Benedict 2010, p.
37). However, the authors do not test this claim statistically.
They also find that the highest level of math exposure is more highly correlated
with economics performance than ACT math scores. Based on this finding, the authors
argue that exposure is more important than the ability to solve problems, such as those
found on the ACT. The finding that math ACT subscores perhaps provide different
values in preparations for economics is of particular interest to the current research.
While a strong connection between math and economics is found, the authors fail to
make conclusive findings concerning specific math abilities. The authors’ research
represents a rare attempt to specifically estimate the effects of different math abilities on
performance in economics.
Ballard and Johnson (2004) gather data on students enrolled in an introductory
microeconomics course at a large Midwestern university. These students all took the
same professor for Principles of Microeconomics and the same exams were provided in
each class. Of the 2,313 students enrolled in the class in 1998 and 1999, 1,462

8

Admittedly, inclusion of so many controls may also introduce multicollinearity concerns.
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participated in a survey, which included a ten-question math quiz9—thus the sample size
is 1,462. The authors include four measures of mathematical ability:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The score on the math section of the ACT
The score on the math quiz administered early in the semester
Whether the student had taken calculus
Whether the student had been required to take remedial math (Ballard and
Johnson 2004, p. 8)

The authors seek to find the correlation between each of the above math measures and
final grade in Principles of Microeconomics. The authors find that each of these
measures of math is statistically significant even when all four measures are included in
one regression. Net of other variables, required enrollment in remedial math is correlated
with a 1.59 point decrease in a student’s final microeconomics grade on a scale of 1 to
100. The completion of calculus is correlated with a 2.83 point increase in Principles of
Microeconomics grade. Math quiz score and ACT math score are correlated with 0.72
and 0.58 unit increases in Principles of Microeconomics grade, respectively. Each of
these results is significant at the 0.05 percent level.
From these findings, the authors (Ballard and Johnson 2004) conclude, “that
quantitative skills are sufficiently multidimensional that no single variable is likely to
represent them adequately (p. 21).” This claim shows that more research is needed to
identify which dimensions of mathematics are most predictive of economics success.
Most research on the subject shows a connection between math and economics ability
and some researchers have found indications that certain math abilities are more relevant
than others in determining a student’s success in economics. However, no existing
research compares the benefits of algebra and geometry for economics students. This is
9

The students were unaware of the quiz and thus did not have time to prepare. The authors do not
report providing any performance incentives for those taking the quiz.
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surprising considering that comparing the benefits of these classes could prove beneficial
to enhancing course sequences and student recruitment. Because there are potential
policy repercussions if all math skills do not influence economics performance equally
and there is little prior literature on the subject, additional research is needed. In the
forthcoming sections, I develop an approach to compare the correlation of performance in
geometry and economics with algebra and economics.
2.3 The education production function
The conceptual framework for my analysis is the education production function.
In a traditional education production function, scholastic achievement is a function of
family, teachers, community, peers, school characteristics, and innate student ability, in
addition to other variables specific to the particular research question. According to
Hanushek (1986), “Economic studies of elementary and secondary schooling have
concentrated on production processes, public finance questions about governmental
support, and, to a lesser extent, labor markets for teachers, cost-benefit analyses of
specific programs, and public-private choices (p. 1143).” These reports often aim to find
the least costly method to provide a certain level of schooling outcomes. Most
frequently, schooling outcomes have been proxied by total years of schooling a student
completes (Hanushek 1997). However, many researchers have used standardized test
scores due to the practicality and ease of collecting data. In addition, some researchers
have used post-educational performance (such as wages) as the output in an education
production function. Generally, more education and increased knowledge are viewed to
have positive effects on the individual and society.
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Hanushek (1986) argues that the traditional, simplified model of production
functions does not easily apply to education:
In an intermediate classroom, production functions are generally assumed
to be known precisely by decision makers, to involve only a few inputs
that are measured perfectly, and to be characterized by a deterministic
relationship between inputs and outputs. (…) The realities of education
(and virtually all other areas for that matter) differ considerably from such
pedagogical assumptions. Indeed, the production function is unknown and
must be estimated using imperfect data; some important inputs cannot be
changed by the decision maker; and any estimates of the production
function will be subject to considerable uncertainty (Hanushek 1986, p.
1149).
As Hanushek eloquently expresses, estimation of an education production function is far
from an exact science. Not all inputs can be identified and enumerated by the researcher,
and thus the effect of an individual input is difficult to isolate.
Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) provide a standard specification for the education
production function:
Og = f (F(g), P(g), C(g), T(g), S(g), α)

(2.1)

where Og is the schooling outcome for a student in grade g. The vectors F, P, C, T, and S
are the family, peer, community, teacher, and school inputs. The authors state that the
superscript g indicates all of the inputs are cumulative from birth through grade g (p.
1058). The symbol, α, represents the student’s innate ability. Prior research concerning
each of these components is discussed below.
Family background
A very important piece of research using the education production function
approach, “Equality of Educational Opportunity”, commonly referred to as the Coleman
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Report provided evidence of a “family effect” on educational outcomes (Coleman 1966).
These effects are “generally small and concentrated among younger students” (Rivkin et
al. 2005, p. 449). Furthermore, family income is positively correlated with the degree of
effort that parents place in supporting a child’s education (Houtenville & Conway 2008).
Unlike teacher and school effects, there is little room for policy makers to improve family
background. Thus, “researchers have not paid close attention to the precise measurement
and specification of family effects” (Hanushek working paper). Nonetheless, researchers
have pointed to the importance of parents’ education (particularly mothers’) in schooling
outcomes (Hanushek working paper; Altonji & Dunn 1995; Ermisch & Francesconi
2000). For example, Plug and Vjverberg (2005) show that family wealth is positively
correlated with schooling outcomes, even after controlling for genes—adopted children
living with wealthy families attain greater schooling outcomes than adopted children
whose families are less wealthy. Additionally, family structure (e.g. traditional nuclear
families vs. single parent) and the quantity of family transitions (e.g. divorce, changing
residences) may contribute to a student’s grades, years of schooling, and other schooling
outcomes (Ermisch & Francesconi 2000; McLanahan & Sandefur 1994; Wu & Martinson
1993). Unfortunately, such family variables are not typically collected by state or federal
education agencies.
Peer effects
Many researchers have found that peers influence performance. The Coleman
Report, for example, (Coleman et al. 1966) shows that the “educational backgrounds and
aspirations” of peers are positively related to a student’s educational achievement (p. 22).
Sacerdote (2001) finds roommates’ GPAs are positively correlated in college.
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Zimmerman (2003) expands on this notion, finding that a roommate’s SAT score is a
determinant of a student’s success (the verbal section is a better predictor than the math
section). Peer affects seem to be particularly valuable for low-ability students; that is,
students who are typically low achievers can gain more from peer influence than those
who are high achievers (Falk & Ichino 2006). Economic education researchers have not
spent much time analyzing the effects of peers. However, one of the few studies on the
subject utilizes the same data employed in my analysis. Clark et al. (2011) show that
high school economics scores of students being taught by the same teacher, at one high
school, during a given year are positively correlated even when controlling for other
relevant variables and teacher fixed effects.10 Specifically, the authors find that a “one
standard deviation increase in the average peer economics EOCT scores results in an
increase of 3 percent of a standard deviation in the individual’s own economics EOCT
score” (p. 4).11 The authors believe that peers “can help one study, model good behavior,
and set standards of achievement” (p. 3).
Community characteristics
Student performance is also impacted by individuals outside of the classroom.
The community (or neighborhood) in which a child lives is important to his or her
educational outcomes, even after controlling for the quality of schools (Jargowsky &
Komi 2011). According to Steele (2010):
Neighborhoods are social environments where children experience life: presenting
risks and opportunities, offering or withholding resources necessary for success,
10

Unfortunately, the data do not allow Clark and his coauthors (or myself) to narrow peer effects down to
students all in the same classroom. For example, two students taking different economics classes from
the same teacher in 2008 are considered “peers”.
11
Economics End-of-Course Tests (EOCT) are fully described in section IV of my paper.
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creating experiences with and about social institutions and their representatives,
and providing the ecology in which children are developing into adults (p. 2).
A child’s community has been shown to influence health (Latkin & Curry 2003;
Boardman et al. 2001), sexual behavior (Sucoff & Upchurch 1998), and the likelihood of
committing crimes (Sampson & Laub 1994). 12 Each of these characteristics can quite
obviously have an impact on a student’s education and there is evidence that they do.
Owens (2010) finds that the “absolute level of neighborhood resources positively
predicts earning a bachelor’s degree, while relative neighborhood socioeconomic status
compared to school peers (…) predicts high school graduation (p. 287).” Furthermore,
residing in a neighborhood with “more affluent families, a higher proportion of
managerial or professional workers, a lower high school dropout rate, a lower
unemployment rate, and more ethnic diversity increases the chances of an adolescent
completing high school and positively affects overall educational attainment (p. 289).”
District-level data for the above characteristics serves as a logical starting point when
accounting for community effects when I lay-out my model in the forthcoming sections.
Teacher characteristics
There is some evidence that teacher quality has a positive effect on student
outcomes. For example, Rivkin et al. (2005) use a value-added approach, studying the
increase in knowledge of students as they progress through the fifth, sixth, and seventh
grades. They find that “a one standard deviation increase in average teacher quality for a
grade raises average student achievement in the grade by at least 0.11 standard
deviations... in mathematics and 0.095 standard deviations in reading (p. 434).” Rockoff
12

Steele (2010) provides a thorough review of the literature on neighborhood effects, which was
particularly useful.
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(2004) observes a similar connection between teacher quality and student outcomes. He
reports, “Ten years of teaching experience is expected to raise vocabulary and readingcomprehension test scores, respectively, by about 0.15 and 0.18 standard deviations (p.
250).” Clotfelter et al. (2007) find that teacher experience can also improve student
learning in math. Experienced teachers are shown to outperform new teachers by about
0.1 standard deviations, with much of the variation in teacher quality concentrated within
a teacher’s first few years. While there are some studies that find a clear connection
between teacher quality and student performance, meta analyses by Hanushek (1997,
2003) show that a connection between the observable characteristics of teachers (most
notably, experience and education) and quality is not well established. Among prior
studies, teacher experience and quality are found to be statistically and positively
correlated far more often than negatively correlated, yet most studies find no statistical
significance.
Empirically, there is only a weak link between experience and quality and
essentially no consistent evidence that teacher education matters. Because teacher quality
is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify or proxy, it is often omitted from education
production functions even though there is evidence that student outcomes differ
depending on the effectiveness of economics teachers in economics (Watts & Bosshardt
1991). Since teacher experience and training in economics is widely varied (Baumol &
Highsmith 1991), it is possible that teacher effects are greater in economics than other
disciplines. Prior researchers (Clark et al. 2012; Swinton et al. 2012; and Clark et al.
2011) who have used the same dataset that I employ have utilized teacher fixed effects to
account for this possibility.
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School effects
Rivkin et al. (2005) find that class size is often statistically related to performance
in math and reading of students between 4th and 7th grade, inclusive. The effect is fairly
small and tends to decline as students age—by the seventh grade, class sizes seems to
have no systematic effect. In addition, the effect seems to be larger for math than
reading. This is one potential channel where increased funding could improve student
performance. Project Star (Tennessee State Department of Education 1985-1990)
extensively examined the effect of class size in the state of Tennessee. According to Finn
and Achilles (1990), research from project STAR “leaves no doubt that small classes
have an advantage over larger classes in reading and mathematics in the early and
primary grades (p. 573).” The findings in Rivkin et al. (2005) and Project STAR run
contrary to the consensus of relevant literature. In a meta analysis, Hedges et al. (1994)
show that prior research finds no consistent effect of class sizes. Class size is only found
to be relevant in roughly 27% of studies. Of these studies, roughly half have found that
smaller class sizes negatively influence student outcomes. While a majority of studies
undertaken at state levels find a statistically significant, positive, effect of smaller class
sizes (Hanushek et al. 1996), state-level data tend to suffer from omitted variable bias.13
The Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966), which found that per-pupil
expenditure (PPE) has no effect on schooling outcomes, sparked a debate on the effects
of school funding. While the Coleman Report is extensively cited in other works,

13

Studies using aggregated, state-level data tend to inflate the role of school resources and class size.
Hanushek et al. (1996) suspect that there are many differences among state education systems which are
not adequately controlled in many models. Thus, much of the state-level differences in education are
erroneously attributed to school resources and class size.
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Hanushek (1986) states that it is “heavily flawed” (p. 1150). Nevertheless, a multitude of
similar studies have largely been unable to disprove the finding that PPE does not affect
schooling outcomes. As with class size, non-zero effects of school spending seem to be
found only when the data are analyzed at the state level. In 28 state-level studies, PPE is
found to positively impact outcomes in 64% of studies (Hanushek et al. 1996). In studies
at the classroom, school, district, and county levels, only 19% find a positive, statistically
significant, effect.14
A meta analysis by Hedges et al. (1994) shows that many characteristics that one
might assume affects schooling outcomes do not consistently matter. Per pupil spending,
teacher education, teacher salary, class size, administrative inputs, and facilities do not
seem to affect student performance. According to Krueger (1999), “Much of the
uncertainty in the literature derives from the fact that the appropriate specification—
including the functional form, level of aggregation, relevant control variables, and
identification—of the ‘education production function’ is uncertain” (p. 497-498).
Furthermore, researchers are unable to create truly randomized experiments, which lead
to dubious results. Because some researchers have found that school effects are relevant
in some cases, I would prefer to include some school-level variables in my models.
Unfortunately, the data do not include any relevant variables for school effects.
Inherent student abilities
The final component of the education production function is inherent (or innate)
student abilities. As one would expect, inherent student abilities are impossible to
14

This statistic was found by calculating the number of statistically positive effects (26) and total nonstate cases (135) from Table 2 in Hanushek et al. (1996, p. 613).
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quantify. Student’s may have an inexplicably high motivation for success in education,
an inherent interest in educational topics, or simply seem to enter school with an
unexplained preparedness or heightened maturity. Because of the nature of this
component, there is little literature directly aiming to identify these innate abilities.
The education production function identified by Hanushek and Rivkin (2006)
indicates that students are born with an innate ability. Educational outcomes will thus be
based on this initial endowment of innate ability and the influence of family, peers,
community, teachers, and school inputs. Ideally, each of these inputs would be easily
identifiable and adequate data would be collected in a randomized experiment. As with
all studies that estimate schooling outcomes, the data I utilize are imperfect. Nonetheless,
I will create models that approximate the educational production function as suggested by
Hanushek and Rivkin (2006).
2.4 Georgia high school math and economics
This study analyzes Georgia high schools under the Quality Core Curriculum
(QCC), which has been gradually phased out over the last several years. In this system,
Georgia students were placed into one of four program categories; College Preparatory
(CP), College Preparatory with Distinction (CP+), Technology/Career-preparatory (TC),
or Technology/Career-preparatory with Distinction (TC+). Because student tracking can
influence effort, performance, and the quality of peers (Hanushek & Wössmann 2006;
Carbonaro 2005; Kubitschek & Hallinan 1998), these program categories are likely
determinants of overall student success and performance in Economics. Unfortunately,
students’ program categories are not provided in the data. CP and CP+ students were
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required to take at least 4 units of mathematics, including Algebra I and Geometry.
High-achieving students, typically CP and CP+, often entered high school having already
completed Algebra I during middle school. Thus, these students often completed
geometry and Algebra II in 9th and10th grade, before enrolling in upper-level classes in
subjects such as statistics and calculus. TC and TC+ students were required to complete
three units of mathematics, including Algebra I. However, geometry was not compulsory
for TC and TC+ students. Students taking geometry and Algebra I were required to
complete an end-of-course-test (EOCT) prior to course completion. They were not
required to pass these exams, but each test counted as 15% of a student’s final grade in
the class. According to the Georgia Department of Education:
The EOCT are designed to improve student achievement by assessing student
performance on standards in the QCC specific to each course tested. The results
of the EOCT will be used to help make instruction more effective and to ensure
that all Georgia students have access to a rigorous curriculum that meets high
performance standards. Student performance on the EOCT will be available for
diagnostic and remedial use. The results will also be used for student
accountability and for gauging the quality of education in the state (GADOE.org
2009).
Algebra I and geometry EOCT contained 90 multiple choice questions, which were
divided into two sections of 45 questions. Each EOCT was composed of two 60 minute
sections with a short break between sections (GADOE.gov 2011, p. 7).
Algebra I, under the QCC, was usually taken during eighth or ninth grade. The
five content domains are (1) Algebraic Fundamentals, (2) Operations on Real Numbers
and Algebraic Expressions, (3) Solving Equations and Inequalities, (4) Functions and
Their Graphs, and (5) Connections and Applications. Upon completion of Algebra I,
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students took the algebra EOCT. Practice questions for the algebra EOCT are provided
in the appendix.
The geometry curriculum implemented under QCC was grouped into six domains:
(1) Logic and Reasoning, (2) Points, Lines, Planes, and Angles, (3) Congruence and
Similarity, (4) Polygons and Circles, (5) Perimeter, Area, and Volume, and (6)
Coordinate, Transformational, and Three-Dimensional Geometry. Like Algebra I,
students enrolling in geometry would complete one full unit in the course before taking
the geometry EOCT. Students were allowed a standardized formula sheet for the
geometry EOCT that includes formulas for perimeter, area, and volume of various two
and three-dimensional shapes. Practice problems for the geometry EOCT can be found in
the appendix.
The QCC was initiated in 1985 in an effort to standardize education in Georgia by
providing specific checkpoints for student learning. However, a 2004 statewide audit
conducted by the U.S. educator’s organization, Phi Delta Kappa, found that QCC did not
meet the national standards set by No Child Let Behind (Thomas 2008). Twenty-two
years after its inception, QCC was gradually phased out, beginning in 2007. It was
replaced by Georgia Performance Standards (GPS), which further standardized the
educational guidelines by providing specific guidelines for schools, students and test
makers (Thomas 2008, p. 20). This new program provides math courses that are widereaching so that basic geometry and algebra concepts (along with other mathematical
ideas) would be taught within the same introductory math class—Mathematics I.
Mathematics II and Mathematics III expand on this broad-based knowledge. By
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providing comprehensive courses, policy makers hope that students will develop more
sophisticated levels of understanding mathematics.
Because there are no data on EOCT test scores after GPS was implemented, this
paper will focus on QCC mathematics only. Although Georgia high schools no longer
provide specifically characterized math courses, the results found in my paper can still be
useful to educational policy makers in Georgia. This is especially true considering there
is no state-wide mandate on the grade in which economics is taken or the pre-requisites
for enrollment. All of Georgia’s bordering states (Alabama, Florida, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee), and most other states, provide distinct course offerings in
mathematics, including Algebra I and geometry. Thus, my results can be helpful in
improving course-sequencing and students recruitment efforts in the many states that
utilize education systems similar to Georgia’s QCC.
Under the QCC, all students were required to complete “one-third or one-half unit
of Principles of Economics/Business/Free-enterprise” (High School Graduation
Requirements for Students Enrolling in the Ninth Grade for the First time in the 2002-03
School Year and Subsequent Years 2002) and an economics EOCT. As with Algebra I
and geometry, the economics EOCT serves as a high-stakes examination, accounting for
15% of a student’s final grade in the course. Upon introduction of the economics EOCT,
many districts altered course scheduling so that students took economics in 11th or 12th
grade. Because teachers were now accountable for their students’ performances, teachers
had a greater incentive to focus on the five state domains of economics: (1)
Fundamentals of Economics, (2) Microeconomic Concepts, (3) Macroeconomic
Concepts, (4) International Economics, and (5) Personal Finance Economics. Sample
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questions for the economics EOCT are provided in the appendix. Thus, introduction of
the economics EOCT led to a greater degree of uniformity among economics courses
throughout Georgia.15 The data consist of all Georgia public high school students who
took the economics EOCT between fall of 2005 and spring of 2008.
A comparison of the algebra, geometry, and economics practice problems
provided in the appendix provides some evidence that both algebra and geometry may be
helpful to one’s performance in economics. For example, consider the economics
problems provided in Figure 2.1. The question provided on the left utilizes the type of
skills that one would hopefully master in Algebra I. The graphical questions (such as the
question provided on the right), while unique to economics, would benefit students who
have gained an understanding of graphs. Because graphs are extensively used in algebra
and geometry, one would expect that students who succeed in these math courses would
carry an advantage into the economics course. While there are links between algebra and
economics as well as geometry and economics, the practice problems provide no
evidence that one of these math skills would be of superior value in preparing students
for economics.
2.5 Data and methodology
2.5.1 Data description
Data are available for 240,874 students in Georgia who took the economics
EOCT. Scores on the algebra and geometry EOCT are available for 60.1% and 60.2% of

15

Much of the information concerning the Georgia high school Economics was provided in a telephone
interview with Glen Blankenship (2012), Associate Director and Chief Program Office for the Georgia
Council on Economic Education.
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students, respectively. For 41.4% of students, scores for both math courses are available.
Math EOCT scores are only available for students who took the classes prior to
completion of economics. The dataset contains no information on student outcomes after
completion of economics. Economics was usually completed during 11th or 12th grade.
Thus, the data (for the most part) include only the subset of students who matriculated
beyond 10th grade.
In my analysis, I attempt to create an education production function model that
mirrors the approach set forth by Hanushek and Rivkin (2006). Unfortunately, there are
no specific school variables provided in the dataset (although many variables are likely
correlated with teacher or school quality). Instead, variables are placed into five distinct
categories; (1) Family Effects, (2) Peer Effects, (3) Community Effects, (4) Teacher
Characteristics, and (5) Student Characteristics. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide a brief
description and summary statistics for these variables. Each of these variables, which are
discussed in depth in the following pages, is believed to influence economic knowledge,
based on prior research and economic theory.
Family effects
The only family characteristics variable provided in the data is Lowincome, which
equals one if a student qualifies for free or reduced lunch based on Federal income
eligibility guidelines.16 For the 2007-2008 school year, students from four-person
families with a household income not exceeding $38,203 were eligible for free or reduced
lunch. On the SAT, students from high-income families (household income exceeding
16

Income guidelines for 2007-2008 can be found here:
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/governance/notices/iegs/IEGs07-08.pdf
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$100,000) outperform poor students (household income below $10,000) by an average of
114 points per section. While some economists have found that family income is
indirectly related to a child’s schooling outcome (through parental ability, attitudes,
expectations, schooling, etc. [Davis-Kean 2005; Shea 2000]), income is generally
considered a causal determinant of schooling success. In an analysis of adopted children,
Plug and Vijverberg (2005) found support for a causal relationship between income and
schooling outcomes, even when controlling for other important variables, such as the
number of siblings and parental education and IQ. Based on this result, if two siblings
with the same birth parents are adopted by different families, the child entering a
wealthier home is more likely to experience success in academics. Previous studies using
a database similar to the one I employ have found that family poverty is inversely related
to performance on the economics EOCT (Clark et al. 2011; Swinton et al. 2010). Thus, I
expect to find a negative relationship between Lowincome and achievement on the
economics EOCT. In my sample, 35.0% of students are characterized as Lowincome.
Peer effects
Peer ability (Econpeers) is simply the average standardized economics EOCT of
fellow students who all completed economics at the same school, during the same year,
with the same teacher. Due to limitations in the data, there is not enough information to
identify economics EOCT scores for students within the same class. For example, a
teacher instructing three sections of economics in a given year may have 60 students. In
this case, a student’s Econpeers value would be the average standardized economics
EOCT score of the teacher’s other 59 students. While this variable is imperfect,
Econpeers still manages to provide a indicator of the degree of effort and success of a
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student’s peers in economics. As discussed in section 2.3, Clark et al. (2011) find that
peer scores on the economics EOCT do indeed correlate with a student’s own economics
EOCT score. I use a similar description to that which is employed in Clark et al.
(2011).17
Community effects
Because a student’s community influences his or her achievement (Owens 2010),
it is necessary to create control variables for community effects. There are no community
variables provided in the original data, but I am provided with the district in which a
student attends school. Using data from the United States Census Bureau, I create five
district-level controls. Dpopulation is the population density (per square mile) of the
district in which a student attends school. Dincome is the average income within this
district, while Dwhite is the percentage of residents who identify themselves as “white.”
While these three variables certainly do not completely capture the characteristics of a
student’s community, they should provide a snapshot of the socioeconomic landscape of
the students’ district.
A fourth distinct district level control is DTexperience, which is the average
number of years of teaching experience for all teachers (Pre-k through 12th grade) within
a student’s district during the 2005-2006 school year. 18 The average teaching experience

17

Some of the data are flawed. For example, one teacher is shown to have hundreds of students and
teach at dozens of schools. Obviously, this is a mistake and is excluded from the data in the Clark et al.
paper. However, there are several additional teachers that are shown to teach at more than three
schools. While this may very well be the case, it is also possible to that this is an error in the data. I
exclude peer effects for all students who had a teacher shown to teach at more than three schools within
a given year.
18
Admittedly, students may transfer in and out of districts, diminishing the effectiveness of this variable.
Furthermore, teacher quality may differ within districts. Nonetheless, DTexperience likely provides some
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is found to be 12.3 years as reported in Table 2.4. Researchers (for example, Clotfelter et
al. 2007; Rivkin et al. 2005; Rockoff 2004) have found that teacher experience is often
positively correlated with teacher quality and student outcomes. Furthermore, teacher
experience in Georgia is a direct determinant of salary—teacher experience may serve as
a proxy for resources and per-pupil spending (State Salary Schedule 2011). Thus, I
expect that districts with more experienced teachers will produce higher achieving
students. While teaching experience for each student’s economics teacher would also be
relevant to success on the economics EOCT, this variable is not provided in the data.
DSTratio (Student-teacher ratio), defined as the number of students divided by the
number of teachers in a district, serves as the fifth and final district-level variable.
Although debated, some researchers (Rivkin et al. 2005; Tennessee State Department of
Education 1985-1990; Finn & Achilles 1989) have found that students from small classes
attain higher achievement levels than students in larger classes. Furthermore, class size is
inversely related to school funding—a higher ratio of teachers requires more spending per
pupil. Thus, I suspect that DSTratio is a relevant variable, inversely related to a student’s
overall academic performance, including scores on the economics EOCT.
One potential issue with the inclusion of district-level data is measurement errors
resulting from aggregation. Community effects may greatly differ within each school
district so that the experiences of students are highly varied within each district. This
issue, which is addressed in Hanushek (1979, p. 372-373) is impossible to avoid without
dropping community variables. While these variables are imperfect, I believe that the

indication of a student’s educational experience. 2005-2006 was chosen since it is the most recent school
year where all students in the data set were attending high school.
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benefits of including district-level variables outweigh the potential issue that these
variables will not always reflect the experiences of the students in the data.
Teacher characteristics
Each high school economics teacher in Georgia is allowed to take the Teaching
High School Economics workshops administered by the Georgia Council of Economic
Education (GCEE). These two-day workshops aim to enhance economics teachers’
effectiveness by improving lesson introducing GCEE materials and enhancing lesson
plans (Swinton et al. 2012). I include two teacher characteristics variables. TWorkshop
indicates the number of total hours of the workshops a student’s economics teacher has
ever attended. I also include TWorkshop^2, which is the squared value of TWorkshop.
This accounts for the possibility of decreasing or increasing returns to scale for teachers
attending these workshops. Less than 12% of economics teachers in the dataset have
completed at least one workshop. On average, teachers have attended less than one-halfhour of workshops. Prior researchers have found that these workshops are indeed
improving student outcomes on the Georgia economics EOCT (Swinton et al. 2012;
Swinton et al. 2010).
Student characteristics
The first student characteristic controlled for in my model is ethnicity, which is
measured by four dummy variables: Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Other. The omitted
variable is White. Asian and white students outperform all other students on the math
section of the SAT, so it is expected that Asian and white students are also likely to
perform comparatively well in high school economics. However, the literature on the
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subject is surprisingly sparse. Stockly (2009) reports that white students outperform
minority black and Hispanic students in microeconomics and macroeconomics classes.
While Asian Americans outperform whites in macroeconomics, there is no significant
difference in microeconomics performance. Within the literature, there is a great deal of
disparity—some find a significant correlation between race and performance in
economics courses (Clark, et al. 2011; Swope & Schmitt 2006) and others do not (Borg
& Stranahan 2002; Lopus 1997; Mccoy & Brasfield 1991). The NAEP indicate a
significant difference in test scores between whites and blacks, whites and Hispanics,
Asians and blacks, and Asians and Hispanics (Walstad & Buckles 2008). It is possible,
however, that the differences in scores are not significant once controlling for family
income and other relevant variables.19 I have chosen to include dummy variables for race
to be consistent with prior literature in economic education, but acknowledge the
possibility that race is merely spuriously related to performance on a standardized
economics exam.20 As indicated in Table 2.2, 38.4% of students in the sample are black,
while 5.3% and 3.5% of students are Hispanic and Asian, respectively.
The second variable in this category is Disabled, which indicates if a student is
characterized to have a disability. The Georgia Department of Education categorizes
disability based on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which states
that a “child’s educational performance must be adversely affected” to be considered

19

Authors of discussed papers have indeed included measures of family income and other potentially
relevant family variables. However, it is plausible that such variables may fail to accurately capture the
living and learning conditions for each student.
20
Relative to race, family income is shown to be a much more sound determinant of student performance
(Duncan and Murnane [2011, chapter 5] provide a thorough discussion of this topic). Thus it may be the
income differences among races that drive any significant findings for the race variables. Unfortunately, a
direct measure of family income is not provided in the dataset.
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disabled (Categories of Disability Under IDEA 2012).21 On the National Assessment of
Education Progress (NAEP), students without disabilities outscored disabled students 153
to 116. Because disabilities provide additional challenges for students, I expect Disabled
to be negatively related to one’s economics EOCT score (Economics Report Card 2006).
Seven percent of students in the data are classified as “disabled.”
I also expect that the dummy variable, Female, will be inversely related to
performance on the economics EOCT. Between the years of 1970 and 2006, males
outperformed females by an average of 38.6 points on the math section of the SAT,
indicating a gender gap in mathematics.22 The cause of this gender gap is debated. It
may be a result of socialization (Fryer & Levitt 2009; Wigfield et al. 2002; Jussim 1996)
or based on preferences (Makri-Botsari 1999; Eccles 1994). Additionally, males are
shown to have higher mathematical competency beliefs at an early age (Wigfield et al.
1997; Eccles 1994; Eccles et al. 1993; Marsh 1989), which may lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy as males extend more effort to the subject. Regardless of the cause, “girls are
losing ground in math in every region of the country, every racial group, all levels of the
socio-economic distribution, every family structure, and in both public and private
schools” (Fryer & Levitt 2009). The National Assessment of Education Progress in
Economics (NAEP) found that twelfth grade boys are indeed outperforming females in
economics (Walstad & Buckles 2008). I hypothesize that this will be apparent with
Georgia EOCT data, indicating that either a math gap is widening as students progress
21

The specific conditions listed by IDEA: Autism, deaf-blindness, deafness, developmental delay,
emotional disturbance, hearing impairment, intellectual disability, multiple disabilities, orthopedic
impairment, specific learning disability, speech of language impairment, traumatic brain injury, and visual
impairment, including blindness.
22
Much of this difference is apparent at the far right end of the distribution. Compared to females, twice
as many males attain very high achievement levels on the math SAT (Ellison & Swanson 2010; Xie &
Shauman 2003).
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from Algebra I and geometry to economics or that simply not all of the gender gap in
economics is explained by a gender gap in mathematics. Earlier work on a similar
dataset of Georgia students has indicated a gender gap favoring males in economics is
evident, even when controlling for algebra and geometry performance (Clark et al. 2011).
The duration between economics and the math courses may also serve to capture
students’ educational prowess. Econalggap is the duration, in years, between Algebra I
and economics. Generally speaking, a larger gap indicates a more successful student.
While most students take economics in 11th or 12th grade, higher-achieving students are
more likely to take Algebra I in 8th or 9th grade, whereas many (typically low and
medium-achieving) students may not take Algebra I until 11th or 12th grade. A mean of
2.26 for Econalggap indicates that the average student completes economics 2.26 years
after Algebra I—the standard deviation is 1.05 (about one year). These values are based
on the year and semester in which a student completes these courses. For example, a
student completing the classes in the same semester and year would be given an
Econalggap of zero, whereas a student completing Algebra I one semester prior to
economics would be give an Econalggap of 0.5. Unfortunately, only the year (as
opposed to the year and semester) in which economics was completed is available in the
data. Thus, I suspect that Econalggap and Econgeogap calculations are incorrect by one
semester for some students. Fortunately, many Georgia high schools are on the full-year
system, as opposed to taking different classes each semester—this mitigates the
miscalculations associated with these variables. Since Econalggap and Econgeogap equal
2.26 and 1.76, respectively, one can surmise that, on average, students complete
geometry one-half year (or one semester) after completing Algebra I.
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The final two variables are Algebra and Geometry, which are the standardized
EOCT scores in Algebra I and geometry. These two variables serve as the primary
variables of interest in this paper. Because there is a strong link between math and
economics skills (Hoag & Benedict 2010; Ballard & Johnson 2004), I expect that Algebra
and Geometry both positively correlate with economics EOCT scores.
Teacher fixed effects
Prior researchers using my dataset (e.g. Clark et al. 2011; Swinton et al. 2010)
have included teacher fixed effects in their regressions. Teacher fixed effects account for
unobservable teacher qualities, which are assumed to be constant through time, by
providing unique intercepts for each teacher in the dataset, based on students’ economics
EOCT score. Teacher fixed effects are particularly important to my model because direct
measures of teacher quality are not provided in the data. I include teacher fixed effects in
all models presented in this paper to be consistent with prior research.23
2.5.2 Methodological process
In the primary model, the economics EOCT score of student i in district j with
teacher k is regressed on a constant, measures of student characteristics, family effects,
peer effects, and community effects using ordinary least squares (OLS):
Econijk = α + β1Asiani + β2Blacki + β3Hispanici + β4Otheri + β5Disabledi
+ β6Femalei + β7Algebrai + β8Geometryi + β9Lowincomei + β10Econpeersi

23

Regression estimates including/excluding fixed effects do not greatly vary for most variables. Most
importantly, the findings for Algebra and Geometry are nearly identical in either case. Nonetheless,
teacher fixed effects should be included because they provide relevant information to a student’s
performance on the economics EOCT.
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+ β11Econalggapi + β12Econgeogapi + β13Dpopulationj + β14Dincomej
+ β15Dwhitej + β16DTexperiencej + β17DSTratioi + β18Tworkshopk
+ β19Tworkshop^2k + uijk

(2.2)

The error term is represented by uijk. I expect that minority students will generally be
outperformed by white students, leading to negative signs for Black, Hispanic, and
Other.24 However, test scores indicate that Asian and white students received similar
scores on standardized tests—thus, I make no prediction for the coefficient of the
variable, Asian.25 Based on prior literature discussed in Section 2.4, I expect positive
signs for Econpeers, Dincome, Dwhite, DTexperience and negative signs for student
teacher ratio (DSTratio), Female, Disabled, and Lowincome. While cities and rural
areas often differ in socioeconomic makeup and student outcomes, I make no prediction
for the sign for Dpopulation.
Of utmost importance is the sign and magnitude of Algebra and Geometry. While
I fully expect β7 and β8 to be positive and significant, the magnitude of β7 and β8 may
differ. Thus, I create a hypothesis test as follows:
Ho: β7 - β8 = 0

(alternatively, β7 = β 8)

HA: β7 - β8 ≠ 0

(alternatively B7 ≠ β8)

(2.3)

In order to estimate the model specified, many observations must be excluded.
This is largely a result of the fact that algebra or geometry EOCT scores are not available
for many students. Table 2.3 indicates the remaining observations after eliminating
24

As mentioned in an earlier section, any significant finding for race is probably at least partially a result
of family income.
25
Source: http://archives.gadoe.org/ReportingFW.aspx?PageReq=102&StateId=ALL&T=1&FY=2008
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unusable data. Of the 240,874 students, only 99,935 took both math courses between
2004 and 2008, inclusive. After making further exclusions to create complete data for
Econpeers and district-level data, the primary sample is left with 92,680 observations.
Table 2.4 provides the summary statistics for the primary model. When
considering what type of student is included in these data, it’s easiest to consider who
would be excluded. I exclude anyone who does not take geometry. Only students who
took the most basic of math courses do not progress to geometry. Thus, this exclusion
removes many low-achieving students, which explains why the average standardized
economics EOCT and algebra EOCT scores for this restricted set are greater than zero.26
I also exclude many students because math scores are not available for anyone who took
geometry or Algebra I prior to 2004. Students not included for this reason were likely
above-average, based on the fact that the math course(s) was taken more than two years
prior to economics.27 Thus, the data for the primary sample excludes many lowachieving and high-achieving students. As a result, the data for the primary model
includes a slightly higher proportion of “medium-achieving” students. This is indicated
by the standard deviations, which are less than one, for Econ, Algebra, and Geometry.
Because the primary model utilizes only a subset of data that obviously differs from the
population, one cannot necessarily generalize the results from the primary regression to
all students.
One potential foil to this model is multicollinearity driven by the high correlation
between Algebra and Geometry, which have a simple correlation of 0.73. However, the
26

Standardized data have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
While almost all students took Economics as Juniors or Seniors, high achieving students generally took
Algebra I and Geometry in the eighth and ninth grades.
27
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variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates that multicollinearity is probably not a concern
for the integrity of this model. No variable possesses a VIF exceeding four and the mean
VIF is 1.96. The VIF for each variable in the primary model is included in Table 2.5.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Primary specification
Table 2.6 provides the results from the primary regression specified in Section
2.5. As indicated by the table, most of the variables are significantly correlated with
economics EOCT score (Econ). Each of the race variables is inversely related to Econ,
which indicates that white students outperform students from other races, net of other
explanatory variables. While this was expected for the Black, Hispanic, and Other
variables, the finding for Asian is surprising since students of Asian descent have been
performing similarly to white students on many of Georgia’s standardized exams. The
interpretation for coefficients of dummy variables is simple. For example, a -0.18
coefficient for Black means that being black is associated with a 0.18 standard deviation
decrease on the economics EOCT after controlling for other variables. As expected,
Lowincome is also inversely related to economics EOCT performance.
Peer economics EOCT scores (Econpeers) are shown to exert a strong positive
effect on a student’s economics EOCT score. Students whose peers have scored, on
average, one standard deviation above the mean on the economics EOCT tend to perform
0.26 standard deviations better than students whose peers have received average marks
on the economics EOCT. While this may simply be a result of peers helping peers or
learning by example, the peer effects variable may also capture school quality. High
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quality schools in high-income areas tend to enroll and produce above average students.
If a student’s peers are receiving high marks on the economics EOCT, the student will
most likely achieve success, but not because of peers helping peers. Instead, the school
may possess superior resources and high quality, experienced, teachers. Since the
available data for teacher quality and school effects are imperfect, much of the apparent
peer effects is likely capturing the schools’ overall quality. Econpeers may also capture
unobserved historical information concerning each student. Consider an economics
course of high-achieving students. Students in this course likely have taken many of the
same classes, enrolled in similar extracurricular activities, and may have even resided in
the same neighborhoods. Such factors could very well be a determinant of scholastic
success, but controls for these variables are not provided in the dataset. Thus, peer
economics scores may be capturing historical information about each student, greatly
inflating the apparent importance of peer effects.28 Due to these concerns, OLS results
most likely overstate the importance of peers.29
As expected, Econalggap and Econgeogap are positive and significant. Each
additional year between Algebra and Economics is correlated with a 0.07 standard
deviation increase in economics EOCT score. Likewise, each additional year between
Geometry and Economics is associated with a 0.08 standard deviation increase in Econ.
The positive coefficients for these two variables is almost certainly due to the fact that
students taking Algebra I and geometry at earlier grades are generally high achievers so
28

A superb explanation of this issue is provided in Hanushek et al. (2003, p. 531).
It is also possible that this strong effect is a result of the degree by which a teacher prepares students
for the economics EOCT. In other words, if an economics teacher spends a semester deliberately
preparing students for the EOCT, one would expect that the students would perform relatively well on the
economics EOCT. Conversely, a teacher who spends more time with tangential material can expect his or
her students to perform poorly on the economics EOCT.
29
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they tend to attain high marks on the economics EOCT. While there is little to be gained
from observing the coefficients for these variables, inclusion of these two variables is
crucial to the integrity of the model because the duration between economics and math
courses is highly correlated with student ability.30
Of the district-level variables, only Dincome, Dwhite, and DSTratio are
significant at the 0.05 percent level, but the coefficients are miniscule. This may indicate
that the specification of these variables is too broad. For example, DTexperience may
greatly differ among schools within a district—thus a district-level variable may fail to
accurately estimate the years of teaching experience for students in the data set.
Unfortunately, there is no clear solution for improving the district-level data.
The controls for teacher ability—TWorkshop and TWorkshop2—are also
significant. A positive coefficient for TWorkshop indicates that in-service training for
economics teachers is associated with higher grades for students’ economics EOCT.
Interestingly, the coefficient for TWorkshop2 is negative, suggesting that the marginal
benefits of attending the economics workshops decline as more workshop hours are
attended.
The estimated coefficients for Algebra and Geometry are, as expected, positive.
The results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in algebra score leads to a 0.20
standard deviation increase in economics EOCT score. A one standard deviation increase

30

For example, the simple correlation between Econ and Econgeogap is 0.41. Econgeogap and
Econalggap are both positively correlated with Econ, Algebra, and Geometry, indicating that the duration
between math courses and economics is, as predicted, indicative of scholastic success.
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in geometry is associated with a 0.35 standard deviation increase.31 While both of these
variables are positively correlated with economics EOCT Score and exhibit large
coefficients, the magnitudes are quite different. Are the magnitudes significantly
different? As discussed in section 2.6, I construct a two-tailed hypothesis test to test for
different coefficients between Algebra and Geometry. Indeed, I find that the coefficient
for Geometry is significantly larger. The F-test statistic for different coefficients is:
F(1, 90972) = 285.81, p < 0.0001.

(2.4)

This statistic indicates a high likelihood that Geometry has more predictive power than
Algebra. There are clear ramifications to the discovery that, relative to algebra EOCT
scores, geometry EOCT scores are a better predictor of economics EOCT performance.
Firstly, these results suggest that taking geometry prior to economics may help students
grasp the concepts in economics. While more investigation is needed, requiring
geometry as a prerequisite for economics could lead to higher test scores without
necessitating increased financial costs. Secondly, these results could be used for student
recruitment. When determining eligibility for an AP economics course, for example,
administrators could consider success specifically in geometry in addition to overall
academic achievement. Lastly, these findings show that economic educators should be
careful when utilizing control variables for math ability in models predicting success in
economics courses or assessments. While attaining controls for algebra and geometry
(and perhaps other math subjects) abilities may be difficult in many studies, the inclusion

31

An alternate regression, which excludes teacher fixed effects, yields a similar finding for these two
variables. When teacher fixed effects are omitted, coefficients for Algebra and Geometry are 0.17 and
0.34, respectively.
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of both controls should improve regression results since these two math variables provide
unique information on the abilities that influence economics aptitude.
2.6.2 Alternative specifications
To further investigate this relationship, I provide alternative specifications. The
first specification includes all students who have taken algebra, but not necessarily
economics. Note that this group of students includes a higher proportion of lowachieving students since students in TC (Technology/Career-preparatory) were not
required to take geometry. Table 2.7 provides the summary statistics for students who
have taken algebra, but not geometry. Table 2.8 provides the regression results. The
model output shows that the correlation between algebra and economics EOCT scores is
strong. In fact, the coefficient for Algebra is statistically stronger than all other
independent variables included. However, as the only true measure of scholastic success,
it is not surprising that Algebra exhibits such a strong correlation with economics EOCT
scores.
I have also prepared a regression excluding Algebra, but including all other
relevant variables. The summary statistics are provided in Table 2.9. Since geometry is a
requisite for CP (College Preparatory) students, students included in Table 2.9 are
typically above average achievers, as evidenced by high marks on the economics EOCT.
The regression results are provided in Table 2.10. Most of the variables exhibit similar
coefficients in both regressions, although the magnitudes are generally slightly weaker in
Table 2.8. I believe this is an indication that Geometry provides more explanatory power
than Algebra. This is supported by a higher R2 value. Although there are fewer data in
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Table 2.10, this model provides a better fit than the model in Table 2.8. Additionally, the
coefficient for Geometry in Table 2.10 is stronger than the coefficient for Algebra in
Table 2.8.
Exploring the effect of the duration between math and economics
It seems likely that the order of math class-taking affects correlation between
math EOCT and economics EOCT. For example, consider a student who takes Algebra I
as a freshman, geometry as a junior, and economics as a senior. The lessons learned from
Algebra I may have been forgotten, weakening the apparent correlation between Algebra
and Economics. Perhaps even more likely, a student’s effort may be a function of time,
i.e., a student’s effort likely differs less over a one-year period than a three-year period.
This would also skew the coefficient values for Geometry and Algebra perhaps inflating
the coefficient for the more recent course completed. The aforementioned tables all
account for this effect, but the gap variables provide little interpretive value. The
following helps explore the effects of class order.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 include only those students who took Algebra I and
geometry in the typical order; Algebra I prior to geometry. Not surprisingly, the effect of
geometry is substantially greater than algebra. The F-test for differing coefficients finds
an F-test statistic of 285.81, which corresponds to an extremely small p-value or less than
0.0001. So, for students who take Algebra I prior to geometry, the effect of geometry is
larger. This is not surprising in the least since this regression includes 96% of the data
from the primary model.
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Table 2.13 includes students who take geometry prior to algebra 1. Only 2.3% of
students for whom data for all necessary variables are available took geometry before
Algebra I. The reasons for taking the classes in this unusual order are unknown, but may
be a result of changing schools or altering educational goals.32 As evidenced by the low
scores on each of the EOCT, students in this subset were typically well below average.
Because these students fundamentally differ from those taking math courses in the
traditional order, differing results between those provided in table 2.14 and alternative
tables could plausibly be a result of unobservable student characteristics rather than
course sequencing effects. As can be seen, the coefficients for Geometry and Algebra are
quite different from prior models. Because Algebra I was taken more recently, the
coefficients for Algebra and Geometry are similar. A two-tailed test for different
coefficients finds an F- test statistic of 0.19 which corresponds to a p-value of 0.67.
While the coefficient for Algebra is nominally larger than the coefficient for Geometry,
there is no significant difference between these coefficients. Based on these results, it
appears that the order of geometry and Algebra I does indeed affect the regression results
for this select group of students.
Next, I include students have took Algebra I and geometry concurrently.
Although the order of classes seems to influence the apparent correlation between the
math EOCT and economics EOCT, there will obviously be no such effect in this
regression, which allows for highly interpretable results. This regression only includes
1.3% of students for whom all necessary variables are available. The only structural
change to the model is the exclusion of Econgeogap, which is equal to Econalggap for
32

An analysis of the data indicates that this was not caused by a few districts offering the courses in
reverse order. Rather, most districts had a few students who completed the math courses in this manner.
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this subset of students. Summary statistics, provided in table 2.15, indicate that these
students are also typically low achievers. The regression results are provided in Table
2.16. With an F-test statistic of 5.40, the coefficient for Geometry is larger than Algebra
at the 0.025 percent level of significance. When no gap between algebra and geometry
exists, a student’s geometry EOCT score trumps his or her algebra EOCT score as a
predictor of performance on the economics EOCT. This regression enhances the findings
provided in primary regression. While the order of classes affects the magnitude,
Geometry correlates more highly with Econ, as indicated by results in the tables,
specifically Table 2.6 and Table 2.16.
2.7 Conclusions
Economic education researchers have found a clear positive association between
math and economics ability. However, only a few have tried to dissect this correlation by
analyzing specific math abilities. In this dissertation essay, I analyze data from the
Georgia Department of Education, which includes all Georgia public high school students
who complete a mandatory economics standardized test at the end of a mandatory
economics course during 2006, 2007, and 2008. Various measures of demographics are
included in the data along with performance on standardized Algebra I and geometry
assessments. Relative to Algebra I, I find that geometry standardized tests scores are
more highly correlated with economics standardized test scores.
Geometry could be more highly correlated with Economics than Algebra because
of direct effects, indirect effects, or a combination of both. In other words, the
correlation may or may not contain a degree of causality. Suppose the effect is causal.
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Clearly, completion of geometry prior to economics would improve student outcomes.33
An extrapolation of this result might encourage college economic educators to encourage
or mandate collegiate geometry prior to any economics courses. While I cannot claim
that geometry ability causes economics aptitude, this possibility cannot be dismissed.
The alternative possibility of non-causality is also interesting and worthwhile to
investigate. For a prospective student considering majoring in economics, I often ask
“Do you have a strong math ability?” The current research shows that a more
informative inquiry would be “Are you good at geometry?” If high-achieving geometry
students are more likely to succeed in economics classes, it seems obvious that economic
educators can take advantage and improve the recruiting of students. If the results of this
study are verified, geometry knowledge provides a powerful tool of predicting a student’s
economics success. For example, the results from the geometry EOCT could be used to
assist in determining enrollment for an economics AP Course. More investigation is
needed to verify this finding and to see if similar correlation exists for college students. I
believe that the potential benefit for recruitment and class placement is the strongest
result from this paper. If the effect of geometry ability on economics aptitude is causal or
non-causal, economic educators should be able to use measures of geometry performance
to enhance predictions of a student’s success in an economics course.
The findings may also impact the methods of modeling performance in economics
classes. Prior research analyzing the effects of math ability on economics performance
generally ignores the possibility that different math abilities correlate with economics

33

This may be a two-way street—perhaps the completion of Economics also improves a student’s chances
of succeeding in Geometry.
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performance in different magnitudes. Consider two studies discussed in section 2.2.
Butler et al. (1998) analyze the effects of math ability on economics performance, using
math SAT score as a proxy for math ability. Hoag and Benedict (2010) run a similar
model, but utilize math ACT score instead of math SAT score. This may seem to be a
subtle difference, but the current research argues otherwise. In total, 45% of the math
ACT is comprised of geometry questions compared to 25%-30% on the math SAT
(ACTStudent.org 2013; Erikthered.com 2013). The current research indicates that one
cannot compare the results in these two studies. Because the math ACT includes more
geometry questions, the correlation between scores on the math ACT and economics
performance is probably larger than the correlation between scores on the math SAT and
economics performance. While more investigation is needed, employing generic math
ability control variables seems unwise.
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Table 2.1
Variable Definitions
Student-level variable
Econ
Asian
Black

Definition
Z-score on economics EOCT
One if student receives identifies himself/herself as Asian,
zero otherwise
One if student identified himself/herself as black, zero
otherwise

Hispanic

One if student identified himself/herself as Hispanic, zero
otherwise

Other

One if student identified himself/herself as "other" race (not
asian, black, or white), zero otherwise

Disabled

One if student is listed as a student with disabilities, zero
otherwise

Female

One if female, zero otherwise

Algebra

Z-score on Algebra EOCT

Geometry

Z-score on Geometry EOCT

Lowincome

One if student receives free or reduced lunch, zero
otherwise

Econpeers

Z-score of peers on economics EOCT

Econalggap

Semesters between Economics and Algebra

Econgeogap

Semesters between Economics and Geometry

District-level Variable

Definition

Dpopulation

District population per square mile (in thousands)

Dincome

Average income of all citizens within school district (in thousands)

Dwhite

Percent of district population who are white

DTexperience

Average years of experience for teachers in student's district

DSTratio

Number of students per teacher in a student's district

Teacher-level Variable

Definition

Tworkshop

Total hours of in-service economics training

Tworkshop^2

Total hours of in-service economics training, squared
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Table 2.2
Summary statistics for all data
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Econ
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econ2006
Econ2007
Econalggap
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshop
Tworkshop^2

240874
240874
240874
240874
240874
240874
240874
144852
144996
240874
220167
240874
240874
144852
144996
240496
240496
240496
240320
240319
240874
240874

0.000
0.035
0.384
0.053
0.018
0.070
0.519
0.000
0.000
0.350
0.018

1.000
0.183
0.486
0.224
0.132
0.256
0.500
1.000
1.000
0.477
0.587

0.317
0.330
2.263
1.762

0.465
0.470
1.051
0.847

1.047
51.421
62.497
12.353
14.594
0.437
3.493

0.934
13.166
17.107
1.577
0.839
1.817
31.255
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Min

Max

-5.043 5.475
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
-5.617 5.988
-7.116 6.194
0
1
-3.262 3.117
0
1
0
1
0
4
0
4
0.009
4.527
22.188 87.605
25.4
97.7
9.48
18.6
9
19
0
28
0
784

Table 2.3 Observations and exclusions
Valid Observations for…
All Students taking economics EOCT (full dataset)
Geometry
Algebra
Geometry and Algebra
Geometry, Algebra, and Econpeers
Geometry, Algebra, Econpeers, and all district variables

n
240,874
144,996
144,852
99,735
93,042
92,680

Table 2.4 Summary statistics for primary model
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Econ
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
LowIncome
EconPeers
EconAlgGap
EconGeoGap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTRatio
TWorkshops
TWorkshops^2

0.004
0.029
0.370
0.055
0.018
0.053
0.529
0.161
-0.029
0.345
0.008
2.585
1.573
0.993
52.077
63.153
12.341
14.622
0.136
1.124

0.909
0.169
0.483
0.227
0.133
0.224
0.499
0.998
0.967
0.475
0.552
0.869
0.811
0.878
13.326
16.938
1.598
0.821
1.051
20.479
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Min

Max

-5.043
5.33
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
-5.617 5.988
-7.116 6.194
0
1
-2.427 2.220
0
4
0
4
0.009
4.527
22.188 87.605
25.4
97.7
9.48
18.6
9
17
0
28
0
784

Table 2.5
Variance inflation factor
Variable
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2
Econalggap
Econgeogap
Geometry
Dincome
Algebra
Dpopulation
Dwhite
Black

VIF
3.74
3.67
2.78
2.77
2.46
2.31
2.27
2.13
1.95
1.78

Variable
Texperience
Econpeers
Lowincome
DSTratio
Hispanic
Disabled
Asian
Other
Female
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VIF
1.74
1.54
1.37
1.33
1.16
1.07
1.07
1.03
1.02

Table 2.6
Results for primary model
Variable
Intercept
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
TWorkshop
TWorkshop^2

Coefficient
0.9247
-0.2021
-0.1823
-0.1477
-0.0627
-0.0856
-0.1667
0.1967
0.3466
-0.0559
0.2572
0.0725
0.0800
-0.0468
-0.0042
-0.0032
-0.0035
-0.0382
0.0261
-0.0008
2

n = 92680

|t|
2.23
14.83
13.72
14.92
4.00
7.87
41.10
46.93
65.30
11.08
16.10
15.78
16.56
1.47
1.93
2.56
0.25
1.66
5.93
3.73

R = 0.580
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P>|t|
0.026
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.140
0.053
0.010
0.803
0.097
0.000
0.000

Table 2.7
Summary statistics for Table 2.8
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

Econ
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

-0.140
0.024
0.379
0.057
0.017
0.085
0.513
0.023
0.379
-0.054
2.250
0.892
50.599
64.289
12.502
14.569
0.189
1.307

0.920
0.155
0.485
0.231
0.129
0.278
0.500
0.997
0.485
0.551
1.048
0.868
13.442
16.989
1.619
0.856
1.128
19.986

-5.043
0
0
0
0
0
0
-5.617
0
-2.999
0
0.009
22.188
25.4
9.48
9
0
0

5.330
1
1
1
1
1
1
5.988
1
2.220
4
4.527
87.605
97.7
18.6
17
28
784
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Table 2.8
Results for model with Geometry omitted
Variable
Intercept
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
Dtexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshop
Tworkshop^2

Coefficient
0.2300
-0.2015
-0.2561
-0.2092
-0.0996
-0.1470
-0.1851
0.3955
-0.0737
0.2597
0.1936
-0.0163
-0.0044
-0.0038
0.0110
-0.0145
0.0219
-0.0008
2

n = 135433

|t|
0.74
15.61
52.79
24.29
7.28
17.89
52.88
155.81
17.23
20.37
86.18
0.56
2.46
3.51
0.96
0.84
6.53
4.31

R = 0.542
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P>|t|
0.460
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.559
0.014
0.000
0.335
0.403
0.000
0.000

Table 2.9
Summary statistics for Table 2.10
Variable
Econ
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
Dtexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

Mean
0.098
0.036
0.358
0.052
0.018
0.046
0.532
0.028
0.322
0.056
1.709
1.045
52.527
62.757
12.276
14.616
0.334
2.848

Standard Deviation
0.938
0.185
0.479
0.223
0.133
0.209
0.499
0.995
0.467
0.567
0.845
0.890
13.286
16.806
1.575
0.809
1.654
30.234
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Min
Max
-5.043
5.33
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
-7.116 6.194
0
1
-2.629 3.117
0
4
0.009
4.527
22.188 87.605
25.4
97.7
9.48
18.6
9
17
0
28
0
784

Table 2.10
Results for model with Algebra omitted
Variable
Intercept
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

Coefficient
0.2394
-0.1880
-0.2167
-0.1664
-0.0671
-0.1521
-0.1747
0.4447
-0.0654
0.3144
0.1905
0.0333
-0.0108
-0.0002
0.0201
0.0008
0.0204
-0.0007
2

|t|
0.80
16.92
41.84
19.14
4.97
15.02
49.02
101.13
14.85
24.73
60.71
1.59
6.85
0.24
1.77
0.05
8.05
5.27

n = 133950 R = 0.566
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P>|t|
0.426
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.112
0.000
0.811
0.076
0.962
0.000
0.000

Table 2.11
Summary statistics for Table 2.12
Variable
Econ
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
TWorkshops
TWorkshops^2

Mean
0.017
0.030
0.382
0.053
0.018
0.050
0.534
0.151
-0.029
0.345
0.020
2.678
1.639
1.064
52.082
63.153
12.305
14.645
0.128
1.011

Standard Deviation
0.912
0.170
0.486
0.224
0.134
0.219
0.499
0.998
0.972
0.475
0.550
0.807
0.836
0.923
12.980
17.255
1.567
0.828
0.997
18.850

61

Min
-5.043
0
0
0
0
0
0
-5.617
-7.116
0
-2.427
0
0
0.007
22.188
25.4
9.48
9
0
0

Max
5.330
1
1
1
1
1
1
5.988
6.194
1
2.220
4
4
4.527
87.605
97.7
18.6
19
28
784

Table 2.12
Results for students who take Algebra I prior to geometry
Variable
Intercept
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

Coefficient
0.9758
-0.2028
-0.1815
-0.1464
-0.0611
-0.0830
-0.1663
0.1956
0.3478
-0.0563
0.2510
0.0964
0.0616
-0.0567
-0.0038
-0.0037
-0.0078
-0.0390
0.0255
-0.0008
2

n = 89283 R = 0.580
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|t|
2.24
14.69
31.05
14.53
3.85
7.50
40.19
45.47
64.24
10.92
15.23
14.62
9.75
1.67
1.68
2.79
0.53
1.62
5.56
3.47

P>|t|
0.025
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.094
0.093
0.005
0.594
0.106
0.000
0.001

Table 2.13
Summary statistics for Table 2.14
Variable
Econ
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

Mean
-0.415
0.015
0.620
0.055
0.016
0.072
0.481
-0.113
-0.730
0.418
-0.204
0.821
1.915
1.329
48.104
56.847
12.202
14.527
0.235
2.079

Standard Deviation
0.794
0.121
0.485
0.228
0.124
0.258
0.500
1.030
0.812
0.500
0.472
0.681
0.669
1.078
11.080
18.297
1.625
0.800
1.423
30.681
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Min
-2.676
0
0
0
0
0
0
-5.617
-7.116
0
-1.701
0
0.5
0.009
23.876
26.1
9.48
11
0
0

Max
2.568
1
1
1
1
1
1
4.157
3.166
1
1.996
3.5
4
4.527
87.605
96.9
17.18
17
28
784

Table 2.14
Results for students who take geometry prior to Algebra I
Variable
Intercept
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Econgeogap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

Coefficient
3.2434
-0.1750
-0.1700
-0.0367
-0.2081
-0.1765
-0.1757
0.2243
0.2183
-0.0139
0.4364
-0.0002
0.0925
-0.0826
-0.0051
0.0012
-0.0702
-0.1520
0.0711
-0.0025
2

n = 2184 R = 0.651
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|t|
1.10
1.49
2.96
0.41
1.51
1.92
4.83
8.98
5.39
0.35
3.16
0.01
2.16
0.55
0.30
0.19
0.65
0.80
2.07
1.84

P>|t|
0.272
0.137
0.003
0.684
0.132
0.056
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.727
0.002
0.995
0.031
0.585
0.763
0.849
0.513
0.422
0.039
0.067

Table 2.15
Summary statistics for Table 2.16
Variable
Econ
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

Mean
-0.485
0.014
0.594
0.069
0.016
0.053
0.474
-0.284
-0.607
0.473
-0.233
1.219
1.201
49.460
57.712
12.315
14.518
0.331
3.575

Standard Deviation
0.837
0.116
0.491
0.254
0.125
0.225
0.500
0.977
0.788
0.499
0.475
0.768
0.981
12.925
15.781
1.632
0.822
1.862
43.360
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Min
-3.522
0
0
0
0
0
0
-5.617
-7.116
0
-1.932
0
0.009
26.194
26.194
9.48
11
0
0

Max
3.071
1
1
1
1
1
1
5.988
3.199
1
1.847
3.5
4.527
87.605
96.4
18.6
16
28
784

Table 2.16
Results for students who take Algebra I and geometry concurrently

Variable
Intercept
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
Disabled
Female
Algebra
Geometry
Lowincome
Econpeers
Econalggap
Dpopulation
Dincome
Dwhite
DTexperience
DSTratio
Tworkshops
Tworkshops^2

Coefficient
0.7066
-0.0587
-0.1412
-0.1641
-0.0124
0.1685
-0.1437
0.1897
0.3874
-0.0883
0.2843
0.0950
0.5362
-0.0412
0.0236
0.0151
-0.0617
0.0359
-0.0011
2

n = 1213 R = 0.736
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|t|
0.16
0.32
1.88
1.57
0.05
1.16
2.78
4.53
7.35
1.58
1.39
2.49
1.82
1.55
1.10
0.14
0.22
0.85
0.68

P>|t|
0.874
0.749
0.061
0.116
0.958
0.247
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.115
0.164
0.013
0.070
0.123
0.271
0.890
0.822
0.397
0.499

Figure 2.1
Two problems from the economics EOCT (GADOE.org 2009. p. 57, 38).
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CHAPTER III
DID ECONOMIC EDUCATION INFLUENCE MACROECONOMIC POLICY
PREFERENCES OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS?

3.1 Introduction
In 2007, the U.S. entered a long period of slow to negative growth and great
economic uncertainty, largely caused by the failures of the U.S. housing market.
Between 1993 and 2006, real prices of new houses rose an unprecedented 48%
(Census.gov). This seemingly unstoppable growth in residential prices increased the
willingness of banks to lend to individuals who had a high risk of defaulting.
Additionally, low interest rates provided incentives for residential investment.
Unfortunately, high prices in the housing market proved to be unsustainable. In 2006,
housing prices sharply declined and many homeowners were unable to refinance their
mortgages and defaulted on payments. As a result, the housing crisis bled into a fullfledged financial crisis as banks and other financial institutions that had been loaning
funds for residential development experienced a simultaneous increase in foreclosures
and decrease in housing values (Temin 2010, p. 9).
The collapse of the financial sector led to contracting private investment and the
longest recession since World War II—beginning in December of 2007 and concluding in
June of 2009 (NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee). Real GDP declined by roughly
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5% during this stretch. Even as the recession ended, the U.S. unemployment rate climbed
to an annual average of 9.6% in 2010. The public was very pessimistic about the state of
the economy and job prospects in particular (Pew Research Center 2010). While U.S.
GDP actually expanded 3% in 2010, most citizens still believed the country was in the
grips of a recession (NBC/WSJ 2010) and 93% of residents believed that the nation’s
economy was “not so good” or “poor” (Blendon & Benson 2010, p. 17).
Based on survey data of a nationally representative sample, I provide an analysis
on the relationship between economic education and policy recommendations of the
general public during the U.S. financial crisis.34 While prior researchers (Roos 2007;
Walstad 1997; Blinder & Holtz-Eakin 1989) found that economics literacy correlated
with policy preferences, they did not simultaneously consider the roles of economics
literacy and economics course-taking. Furthermore, the economics education literature
can benefit from a study taken during the financial crisis—a time when economic
concern was very high (Blendon & Benson 2010, p. 17).
I find that economics literacy and collegiate economics course-taking in college
were positively correlated with support for decreased taxes and a smaller government
during the financial crisis. Additionally, economics literacy is negatively correlated with
support for a proposal to place a salary cap on CEO salaries. Economics literacy and
college economics do not significantly correlate with preferences towards interest rates,
government spending, or bank regulations. Survey respondents who took high school
economics are more likely to support a small role of government, but high school
economics is not significantly correlated with support for any of the other five policies
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Data collection was funded by the United States Department of Education’s Office of Innovation and
Improvement.
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included in the study. Interestingly, economics literacy and economics course-taking are
found to be significant factors even when these variables are simultaneously included in
regressions. This may indicate that economic literacy and course-taking exhibit
independent effects on macroeconomic preferences. The findings in this paper provide
additional evidence that economic education is correlated with macroeconomic
preferences. Based on these results, researchers should include measures of economics
knowledge and course-taking when estimating preferences for many macroeconomic
policies. Because public opinion affects policy (Page & Shapiro 1983; Stimson et al.
1995; Burstein 2003), economic education may influence policy in the United States.
3.2 Does public opinion shape policy?
Do public opinions shape the way policy is made? This simple question has been
a topic of research for quite some time, and the vast majority of public policy researchers
agree that public opinion impacts public policy. For example, Page and Shapiro (1983)
analyze public preferences between the years of 1935 and 1979 and identify 357 cases of
a significant change in public opinion towards a broad list of local, state, and federal
policies. Policy related to the shift in preference is measured from two years prior to the
change in opinion to four years after. This six year period allows for an analysis of the
direction of causality (i.e. does opinion change policy or does policy alter opinion?). The
authors find that a congruent change in public policy (public policy moves in the same
direction as public opinion) occurs roughly twice as often as a non-congruent change in
policy (public opinion and policy diverge).35 Furthermore, a large change in public

35

Congruent changes occurred in 43% of all instances, compared to 22% for non-congruent movements.
In 35% of public opinion changes, policy either did not change or the effect was uncertain. In a similar
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opinion is more likely to cause a change to policy and more likely to lead to a response in
the direction which has gained favor. For example, when opinion shifted by 15% or
more, a congruent change in policy occurred nearly four times more often than a noncongruent shift. Based on the timing of the opinion and policy shifts, the authors are able
to establish that opinion causes a shift in policy most of the time, but cannot rule out the
possibility that policy may also alter opinion in some cases.
Stimson et al. (1995) suggest that public preferences are even more robust in
altering policy. Analyzing the behavior of federal-level policymakers (Congress,
Supreme Court, and the President) and the collective degree of liberalism/conservatism in
the United States, the authors find a clear correlation between behavior and response; as
preferences become more liberal, so does policy. Overall, the authors contend that a oneto-one relationship exists between public opinion and policy at the federal level—federal
policy is directly determined by the preferences of citizens. This paper is of particular
value because it shows, not only that public opinion can affect policy, but also indicates
two simple channels through which opinion can shape policy. First, changes in public
opinion will affect elections and thereby produce a change in policies. Second,
policymakers will change their own behavior if they feel that public opinion is changing;
as public opinion shifts, policymakers will change their behavior to encourage reelection.36 Based on the authors’ findings, elections and the desire to be re-elected allow
for a truly representative democracy in the U.S. Enhancing these findings, Harrington
(1993) shows that politicians are more likely to manipulate policy to encourage repaper, Monroe (1979) also finds a connection between policy and preferences based on changes in
opinion and policy outcomes.
36
The authors provide a simile: “Like antelope in an open field, (politicians) cock their ears and focus their
full attention on the slightest sign of danger (p. 559).”
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election when voters are certain about their policy beliefs. As preferences become more
certain, voters rely on policy rather than the economic performance during a politician’s
tenure. Thus, one would expect that increased economic education would lead to more
certain preferences and a stronger connection between preferences and policy.
Burstein (2006), worries that many empirical studies, such as those discussed
above, tend to overestimate the relevance of opinion because this research tends to use
survey data that only inquires on the hot topics of the day. While a strong relationship
may exist on these hot button issues, Burstein believes that politicians are driving policy
in other areas where the public is largely apathetic. Because of this, some disagree with
the mainstream consensus that opinion meaningfully affects policy. Probably the most
vocal critic is William Domhoff. Domhoff (2002) introduces the possibility that “public
opinion on economic and foreign policy issues generally fluctuates with the narrow
parameters shaped by wealthy and well-organized interests and thus matters only with
these circumscribed limits” (p. 124). Instead of public opinion affecting policy, Domhoff
believes that it is members of the upper-class that are truly influencing policy in the U.S.
and that the general public is too uninterested or ill-informed to alter policy. Instead, the
public is “predisposed to agree with top leaders out of patriotism and a fear of the strange
or foreign” (p. 131).
There are other opponents to the mainstream belief that opinion alters policy. An
overview of their beliefs is provided by Manza and Cook (2002). Instead of altering
behavior based on the public’s beliefs, policymakers may pander to “interest groups,
party and organization interests, or the policy and political dispositions of politicians
themselves” (p. 23). Or, a policymaker’s beliefs may be so strong, that politicians do not
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consider public favor for many issues. It is also possible that media alter the public
opinions of economic policy in a similar manner. According to Herbst (2002), many
media scholars have suggested that “exposure to the news” and public opinion are
causally related (p. 178). Some researchers have suggested that media outlets
intentionally aim to alter opinions, while others (such as McCombs & Shaw 1993) find
that “media content can change the basic nature of our beliefs and values” (Herbst 2002,
p. 178). In general, the only consensus to be found is that the media have some effect in
shaping preferences—the magnitude of this effect varies from case to case (Walgrave &
Van Aelst 2006, p. 90). If public preferences are merely the result of agenda setting by
the elite or from mass media, public opinion cannot be the true driver of policy.
A consensus on the issue is provided by Paul Burstein, in a 2003 meta analysis:
“So far as we can tell from published research, policy is affected by opinion most of the
time; often—over half the time when public opinion has any effect—the impact really
matters substantively” (Burstein 34). While there are opponents to this mainstream
belief, most researchers believe that public opinion, at the very least, matters for issues in
which the public is interested. This is an important finding to the current research.
Because public opinion is a determinant of policy, any aspect that changes public policy
opinions may also alter policy. This is particularly true of the post-1930s era, where
political polling is routine. Because public preferences are transparent, it is easier for
politicians to sway their own behavior to win elections.37
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This theory is briefly mentioned in Manza and Cook (2002). As a result of polling, George Gallup
believed that “politicians ‘will be better able to represent... the general public’ by avoiding ‘the kind of
distorted picture sent to them by telegram enthusiasts and overzealous pressure troupes who claim to
speak for all the people, but actually only speak for themselves’ (Manza & Cook p. 3, quoting Gallup & Rae
1940, p. 466).”
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3.3 Prior research on the role of economic education in determining policy
preferences
The most thorough study on the effects of economics literacy on macroeconomic
preferences is presented in William Walstad’s 1997 paper, The Effect of Economics
Knowledge on Public Opinion of Economic Issues. Walstad analyzed a 1992 survey of
1,005 U.S. adults that included an inquiry of demographic information, educational
attainment, income, policy preferences, and a 15-question multiple choice quiz that
served as a proxy for economics knowledge. At the time of the survey (March 1992),
public interest in the economy and economic policy was high. A recession, which lasted
from the middle of 1990 to the first quarter of 1991, was followed by a slow recovery.
Unemployment rates were rising and the federal budget deficit was increasing. Although
the severity of the 1991 recession pales in comparison to the recent “Great Recession,”
Walstad’s study, like my own, is based on a survey compiled during a time of economic
uncertainty.
In Walstad’s (1997) survey, participants were asked if they support five separate
macroeconomic statements. The means presented in Table 3.1 indicate the proportion of
respondents that provided a response that likely resembled the beliefs of mainstream
economists. For example, about 23% of respondents stated that the Federal Reserve
should set monetary policy—a preference that Walstad assumed would be shared by most
economists.38 Roughly 59% responded “no” to the policy statement, “Reduce federal
budget deficit by increasing taxes on business” (p. 200). Of the 1,005 individuals
surveyed, 876 provided responses to each statement presented in Table 3.1 (p. 200).

38

Walstad did not survey economists for opinions on these policies.
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As indicated in Table 3.1, survey respondents did not typically side with
mainstream economists. Walstad used responses to each statement as a dependent
variable, which was regressed on a host of demographic characteristics and economics
literacy. Walstad found that economics literacy was indeed a determinant of public
policy preferences in 1992. Those with a high level of economics literacy were more
likely to support the statement, “Federal Reserve should set monetary policy” (Walstad
1997, p. 200). However, economics literacy was negatively correlated with indicating
support for the four following statements: (1) Reduce federal budget deficit by
increasing taxes on business, (2) Encourage economic growth by increasing government
spending to provide jobs, (3) U.S. government should prohibit an increase in oil and gas
prices, if the supply of oil is reduced by a crisis in the Middle East, and (4) Limit imports
from other countries to reduce a trade deficit. Economics literacy was the only variable
found to significantly correlate with preferences in all five cases.
Age, gender, and dummy variables for Republican and “Independent” political
identification were found to be significant in three of the regressions, yet no variable
other than the measure of economics literacy proved significant in four or five
regressions (Walstad 1997, p. 201). Comprehensive educational attainment was found to
virtually have no effect on the response to the five statements. Income was relevant in
only one of the five regressions—low income individuals were less likely to respond
“yes” to the statement, “Federal Reserve should set monetary policy.”
According to Walstad, economics knowledge, whether measured by an overall
score or by knowledge of a specific question, may be the most critical factor determining
public opinion on economic issues—“perhaps more important and more consistently
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influential than other personal characteristics such as age, sex, race, education, income, or
political party” (Walstad 1997, p. 203). Walstad’s paper stands as one of the most
complete studies of the effects of economics knowledge on policy preferences.
Due to the limited quantity of research similar to Walstad (1997), additional
research is needed. While each of the policy recommendations in Table 3.1 has
maintained some economic relevance, new concerns have developed in recent years. For
example, the rising salaries of CEOs and other top executives was not a mainstream
concern until the financial crisis. Will citizens still trust the lessons learned in high
school and college economics? I will build on prior research by analyzing the effects of
economics literacy and economics course-taking on policy preferences during the
financial crisis.
While Walstad’s (1997) paper is of particular interest to my research, there have
been other researchers who have addressed the topic. For example, Blinder and HoltzEakin (1984) used two different surveys compiled in 1980 to estimate the determinants of
public support for a balanced federal budget amendment. Although they did not employ
a direct measure of economics knowledge, it is clear that one’s economics knowledge and
subsequent rationales were the primary factors that influenced support for the proposed
amendment. In fact, the authors found that support for the balanced budget amendment
was more highly correlated with the expected economic ramifications than demographics,
political affiliations, or personal circumstances. The implications of this discovery are
clear: If political preferences are determined by economic expectations, the altering of
expectations will theoretically affect public preferences. At least in terms of the balanced
budget amendment, the completion of economics courses can influence preferences if
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economics training is pervasive enough to alter the expected ramifications of the policy.
Because former students retain knowledge from principles of economics classes years
after completion (Saunders 1980), this seems plausible.
Based on a 2003 survey of college graduates, Allgood et al. (2010) found that
economics training was correlated with macroeconomic preferences.39 Compared to the
general public, those who majored in economics were less likely to agree with the
following statements: (1) The distribution of income in the U.S. should be more equal,
(2) A large balance of the trade deficit has an adverse effect on the economy, and (3) If a
cartel reduces the amount of oil available for the United States to import, the U.S. should
not allow gasoline prices to rise more than 10% (p. 33). Even when compared with
business majors, economics majors were less likely to support tariffs and more frequently
cited a positive relationship between minimum wage laws and unemployment in the
market for low-skilled labor. Furthermore, the completion of economics courses was
positively related with joining the Republican Party and with joining a political party in
general. In most of these findings, the effects of majoring (or completing classes) in
economics were statistically larger than all control variables other than race. This
certainly does not mean that taking economics courses caused students to behave
differently. It may very well be that students who took economics courses were already
more likely to join the Republican Party prior to any economics training. Nonetheless,
this paper does indicate a connection between economics course-completion and political
behavior. The policy preferences of economic educators reveal a similar story. Among
economic educators, Becker et al. (1994) discovered that attaining additional training was

39

The survey was mailed to more than 25,000 graduates of Florida Atlantic, University of NebraskaLincoln, University of North Carolina, and Purdue University.
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correlated with exhibiting preferences similar to Ph.D. economists. For example,
teachers of social studies, who generally took about one economics class in college
(Galambos et al. 1985), were less likely to agree with economists than high school
economics teachers, who obtained more extensive training. These results indicate that
additional training in economics is correlated with the characteristic of agreeing with
economists on public policy issues. Admittedly, there is not enough evidence to claim
that this training causes one to “think like an economist.” It is possible, instead, that
individuals with views sympathetic to economists self-select to pursue training in the
subject.
Roos (2007) found less evidence of a connection between economics training and
policy preferences among college students, although his study is based in Germany
whereas the aforementioned research was conducted using students and economists in the
United States. Roos asked students and economists to estimate the expected economic
ramifications of a series of hypothetical events. In addition to typical control variables,
Roos created a few unique variables. The variable “informed” included a question
concerning the members of the European Union and an inquiry of the current German
Minister for Economic Affairs. The variable “knowledge” is composed of questions of
Germany’s population size and employment statistics. While I am not certain if the
variables informed and knowledge are sufficiently heterogeneous to warrant division, the
inclusion of these variables helped isolate the variables of interest—dummy variables for
economics major (equals zero if business administration major) and top quartile grade
earner on an introductory macroeconomics exam. Compared with business
administration majors, economics majors did not exhibit preferences more in line with
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economists. This result runs counter to those presented above. In two of the six
specifications provided by Roos, top grade earners on a macroeconomics exam did
exhibit preferences more closely resembling economists. Strangely, Roos found that
among men, top macroeconomics grade earners were more likely to exhibit preferences
similar to economists whereas the macroeconomics exam performance is irrelevant for
women.40 Overall, Roos’ found minimal evidence that economics training influenced
perceptions to the ramification of economic events.
On the contrary, O’Roark and Wood (2011) found that economics training was
relevant for U.S. congressional voting for the 2007 nationwide minimum wage hike
proposal. Compared to other members of Congress, former economics majors less
frequently voted in favor of the increased minimum wage proposal. This position was
also shared by business and accounting majors, who were, almost certainly, exposed to
economics classes in college. Of course, this finding does little to show that economics
classes influence preferences. It is certainly likely that many economics majors were
more conservative prior to college and were thus less likely to support minimum wage
hikes. However, the authors showed that net of political ideology, economics majors
were still less likely to support the minimum wage proposal. In other words, comparing
two members of Congress—one a former economics major—of the same political
ideology, the economics major was less likely to support an increase in minimum wage.
The general lesson from prior researchers is not surprising: Those who take
economics tend to develop economic beliefs aligned with the highly-trained economists.

40

Roos takes this as evidence that “men seem to benefit much more from economics training than
women (Roos 298).” However, this statement is made under the assumption that economists are correct!
In my opinion, economics is far too subjective to suggest that improving economics knowledge is
equivalent to agreeing with one’s professors.
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This connection between experts and students is probably similar to other disciplines—a
student of history, for example, will likely develop an understanding of historic events
based on experts in the field of history. However, unlike many disciplines, economics is
highly subjective. Thus, it is not self-evident that economics students will always come
to agree with economists on macroeconomic events. Even among PhD economists,
macroeconomics preferences and opinions of the macroeconomics are widely varied
(Gordon & Dahl 2013).41 While economists generally agree on some issues (e.g. free
trade “improves productive efficiency” [IGM 2012]), there is no consensus on many
issues. For example, a recent poll found that economists’ opinions were nearly split on
the expected repercussions of a $9 wage on low-skilled workers [IGM 2013]. While
economics literacy and economics course-taking have been considered as potential
drivers of public preferences, prior research has not adequately addressed these issues.
Only Walstad (1997) analyzed multiple public policies and no researcher has compiled
adequate data to include measures of economic literacy and economics course-taking
within one study. The data, which is presented in Section 3.4, will allow for the most
thorough analysis to date.
3.4 Data
The data come from a national telephone survey of 20,000 adult consumers
administered during March and April of 2010, collected by the Survey Research
Laboratory of the Social Science Research Center at Mississippi State University.
Although the survey was compiled to “evaluate the relationship between economic
literacy and personal opinions about the recent financial crisis (Grimes et al. working
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When economic literature for a subject is well-developed, economists are more likely to agree on an
issue. When issues raise “efficiency or distributional issues”, economists are less likely to agree (p. 632).
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paper, p. 1),” there was no intent to conduct the study presented in this chapter when the
data were collected. Land-lines, cell phones, and households with unlisted numbers were
included in the survey; these numbers were selected using random-digit-dialing (RDD).
At a maximum, telephone numbers were dialed eight times in an attempt to procure a
high response rate. Of the 20,000 calls, 2,869 eligible persons were reached.42 Among
these calls, interviews were completed for 1,408 individuals, yielding a cooperation rate
of 49.1%. Successful calls were made to all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Based on the size of the dataset, the sampling error for binomial questions in the survey is
less than 3.5%, when using a 95% confidence interval.
Participants were asked a series of questions that included inquiries of
demographic information, personal financial behavior, perceptions and opinions of the
recent financial crisis, and various measures of education and economics literacy. Survey
respondents had a mean age of 54.3 years. In regards to race, the survey captured a fairly
representative sample. For example, 83.6% of respondents were white, which is only
slightly higher than the 2009 national population estimate of 79.6% (U.S. Census Bureau
2009). Fifty-eight percent of participants were women. A discussion of the dependent
and independent variables is provided below.
3.4.1 Dependent variables
One series of questions asked participants to cite which possible policies would
have helped solve the financial crisis. Response frequencies are given in Table 3.2 along
with the information provided to respondents for this particular question. Sixty-nine
survey participants believed that none of these actions would solve the crisis—these
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There were several reasons why a phone number was deemed ineligible. The two primary reasons for
an ineligible call were non-working numbers (58.0%) and calls that received no answer (15.4%).
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individuals are included in the “no” response for each individual category. Among the
six options, survey respondents most frequently (41.0%) supported “Increase government
regulation on banks and Wall Street” while only 15.1% of respondents favored “Increase
government spending to stimulate the economy.” These questions were chosen since
they seemed to reflect the most controversial and widely-discussed macroeconomic
issues of the time.43 Two of these policies—Regulatebanks and LimitCEO—were not
mainstream concerns in the years immediately preceding the “Great Recession,” but
received major media attention during the downturn.44 Responses to these six questions
will serve as the dependent variables in my probit regressions. Thus, each series of
models will include six distinct regressions.
3.4.2 Independent variables
Economic education variables
In this paper, I am most interested in the relationship between economic education
variables and responses to the policies presented above. Three measures of economic
education are provided in the data set. Roughly 69% (966) of participants report
engaging in some type of post-secondary education. These individuals were asked to
estimate the number of economics courses they completed during their undergraduate
schooling. In total, 42.6% of respondents report taking at least one college economics
course. Table 3.3 provides a breakdown of the respondents’ total quantity of economics
classes taken in college. In addition, 45% of respondents reported taking an economics
course in high school. Econcourses, the self-reported quantity of economics courses

43

Walstad (1997) seemingly chose his policy questions in part due to the fact that there was a
mainstream economic consensus for each question. This is not the case in my study.
44
One question included in the survey I am using asked participants who deserves blame for the financial
crisis. Among seven possible choices, “Wall Street and the large banks” was most frequently chosen.
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taken during college, and HSecon, a dummy variable for high school economics, serve as
two of the independent variables of interest. In order to compare the effects of economics
courses and business courses, I also include Businesscourses and HSbusiness in one set of
regressions. These variables are defined in the same manner as the economics coursetaking variables.
To create a measure of economics literacy, survey participants were asked to
answer seven basic economics questions. These questions “were designed to measure
actual economic literacy across seven basic areas of knowledge” (Grimes et al. working
paper). Table 3.4 displays the seven-question economics quiz with correct answers in
italics and response rates provided next to each answer. For example, about 46% of
participants were able to identify “the gross domestic product” as the correct answer to
the question, “Economic growth is measured by a change in which of the following?”
Roughly 28% reported that they did not know the answer to question one, while about
26% provided an incorrect answer—in either of these cases, the answer is deemed
incorrect.45 Table 3.5 indicates the percentage of individuals correctly answering
questions. Only 3% of all survey participants were able to correctly answer seven fairly
easy economics questions.46 Performance on this economics quiz, Econliteracy, will
serve as a proxy for respondents’ economic literacy.
Other independent variables
In addition to the independent variables provided above, I include other control
variables. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 3.6. Each
45

There was also an option to refuse answering these questions. The rate of refusal ranged from 0.6% to
1.8% among the seven questions. Refusals are not considered “correct” or “incorrect”, thus, all refusals
are excluded from the data presented in Tables 4 and 5.
46
Despite this fact, 54.6% of respondents accessed their economics knowledge to be good or excellent.
Only 8.8% rated their economics knowledge to be poor.

92

variable was chosen for inclusion based upon prior research on the determinants of public
preferences. A discussion of these variables is provided in the remainder of this section.
Age
According to Fisher (2008), younger citizens “generally favor a more activist
government, as demonstrated by their views on equality, the role of government, health
care, and spending for public schools and child care” (p. 504). Based on this statement, it
is not a surprise that Walstad (1997) found age to be a significant determinant of support
for preferences involving business taxes (Deficit) and government spending (Growth).
Interestingly, Roos (2007) found that older citizens were more likely to agree with
economists on expectations of economic events.47 Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (1984)
showed that age was inversely correlated with support for a balanced budget amendment.
Finally, Lau and Redlawsk (2008) found that older voters are less likely to vote
“correctly”—in favor of candidates that support their preferences. Because age has been
found to influence voting behavior and macroeconomic preferences, I will include a
variable for age in each regression.
Gender
Many researchers have shown that women tend to side with the Democratic Party
(Alesina & La Ferrara 2005; Edlund & Pande 2001; Inglehart & Norris 2000). In fact,
56% of women voted for Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election, while only
49% of males selected Obama (U.S. News 2008). Because the Republican Party tends to
advocate fiscal conservatism, I suspect that males will be less likely to support increased
47

Individuals were asked to determine which economic events would have large and small effects on the
overall economy. For example, participants were asked whether an oil spill or tax reform would have a
greater effect on the economy. Roos and his economist colleagues agreed that the tax reform would have
a greater impact. Older participants of the study tended to agree with economists on this issue, relative
to younger participants.
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government spending in my study. Walstad (1997) found that gender was a relevant
variable for support of three of the five economic issues, including the dependent variable
concerning government spending (Growth). In a survey of 250 Ph.D. economists and
1,510 laypersons, Caplan (2001) found that males were more likely than females to agree
with economists on issues of taxes, business growth, and executive salaries among others.
Among the 31 issues for which economists exhibited beliefs that differed from the
general public, being male was positively correlated with agreeing with economists in 17
cases, compared with only two cases where females agreed with economists more often
than males.48 Roos (2007) also found that males were more likely to agree with
economists when comparing the economic outcomes of major economic/political events.
Race
Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and others have shown that black Americans tend to
favor a higher degree of redistribution, relative to other races, even after controlling for
other relevant variables. In fact, the effect of being black is found to be statistically
larger than all other relevant variables. In addition, there is considerable evidence
indicating that voters will cast ballots for politicians of similar racial composition.49,50 It
seems plausible that blacks (and perhaps other minorities) will advocate a high degree of
government action under Barack Obama’s reign as president, since his platform is
supported by so many black Americans. Caplan (2001) found that blacks (relative to
whites) were more likely to agree with economists for 7 of the 31 issues provided; being
48

Interestingly, the two cases for which females agreed with economists involved the long run success of
the economy. Compared to men, women in the general public and economists were more optimistic
about the standard of living in five years and beyond.
49
Michelson (2005) not only found evidence of this hypothesis, but also provides a solid literature review
on the subject.
50
In the 2008 election, 96% of Black Americans voted for Obama (Kuhn 2008). Additionally, voter turnout
among African Americans rose from 59.3% in 2004 to 64% in 2008 (Roberts 2009).
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black negatively correlated with agreeing with economists for only 2 issues. No
significant difference was found in the other 22 cases. Being Asian or a member of
“other” races was correlated with agreeing/disagreeing with economists in only three and
four of the 31 cases, respectively. As indicated by prior research, such as Caplan’s
(2001), race can be relevant in determining some economic preferences, but is not
relevant in all cases. I will include race variables in my paper since I cannot rule out the
possibility that race is a determinant of preferences.
Education
There is evidence that educational attainment is correlated with macroeconomic
preferences. Among the general public, Blendon et al. (1997) found that individuals with
college degrees were more likely to provide congruent answers with economists on
economic issues. College graduates agreed on factual questions (e.g., Compared to 5
years ago, inflation rate is lower, about the same, or higher?) and subjective questions,
such as expectations of the economy in five years and explanations for why the economy
is not stronger. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) showed that individuals with higher
education levels were less likely to support redistribution efforts, while Blinder and
Holtz-Eakin (1984) found that education levels were relevant in determining support for
balanced budget amendments. Furthermore, educational attainment was a major
determinant of voting in the 2008 presidential election as voters with low and very high
educational attainment favored Barack Obama (Exit Polls 2008). For these reasons,
tiered measures of educational attainment are included in my models.
Income
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In addition to the variables discussed above, Walstad (1997) included variables to
account for income. In theory, individuals may “vote with their pocketbooks,” which
causes income to be a significant variable in models predicting macroeconomic
preferences. For example, low income earners may support higher government spending
under the belief that any increase in taxes would fall on upper income categories, yet the
benefits would be distributed to all citizens, thus allowing for personal gain. Only a few
researchers have found evidence of this voting style. Markus (1988) reported some
evidence of pocketbook voting in presidential elections from 1956-1984. Also, Alensia
and Giuliano (2011) showed that richer citizens were less likely to support redistribution
efforts. Since many government programs are redistributive in nature (Medicaid,
welfare, etc.), higher income individuals may be less likely to support government
spending, in general. Thus, I suspect that income will be inversely correlated with
support for increased government spending in my study. Abramowitz et al. (1988) found
that only those voters who were able to identify the connection between the economy and
their own personal financial situation (“sophisticated voters”) utilized pocketbook voting.
Therefore, economic and personal finance literacy may influence the degree to which one
votes with his or her pocket. While pocketbook voting is theoretically appealing, most
researchers (see Grafstein 2009; Gomez & Wilson 2001; Kinder & Kiewiet 1981) have
found that citizens exhibit “sociotropic voting” tendencies. When an individual votes
sociotropically, her primary goal is to improve the nation, not seek personal gain.
Generally speaking, Walstad (1997) only found income to be relevant in one of five
regressions. To stay consistent with the literature, I use an approach similar to that of
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Walstad by creating four income brackets, which have been scaled upward to account for
inflation between 1992 and 2009.
Political identification
The role of political identification is ambiguous. Clearly, one would expect that
political identification and macroeconomic policy preferences would be correlated.
However, it is also possible that political identification is irrelevant once other important
variables are considered. In other words, race, gender, income, economics knowledge,
and other socioeconomic variables may directly influence one’s political identification
and macroeconomic preferences in the same manner. Walstad found Republican (equals
one if respondent identifies self as a Republican) and Independent (equals one if
respondent does not identify self as Republican or Democrat) to be significant in three of
five regressions. Unfortunately, in the data I employ, there is no information on political
identification. I create the variables Republican and Independent to be consistent and
provide some control for political leanings. As indicated in Table 3.6, Republican is the
percentage of voters in a respondent’s state of residence who voted for the Republican
candidate during the five recent presidential elections. Independent follows a similar
description, equaling the percentage of voters who voted for neither the Republican nor
Democratic candidate. These variables are obviously inferior to the variables employed
by Walstad, but should provide some control for political identification.51
3.5 Methodology
As mentioned in section 3.4, a series of questions (as given in Table 3.4)
concerning economic recovery during the recent recession serves as the dependent

51

For example, residents from “red” states are more likely to be exposed to a conservative media or peer
bias. In theory, this bias will increase the likelihood that residents develop conservative political beliefs.
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variables in the regressions. Because the dependent variables are dichotomous, the
models are estimated using probit analysis. First, I will use a nearly identical
specification to that which is used in Walstad (1997). In doing so, I can make direct
comparisons between Walstad’s findings and my own. This baseline regression is
specified as:
Policy*i = α + β1Agei + β2Malei + β3Whitei + β4Postgradi + β5Collgrad
+ β6Somecolli + β7HSgradi + β8Upperincomei + β9UpmiDincomei
+ β10MiDincomei + β11Republicani + β12Independenti + β13Econliteracyi + ui
(3.1)
In this baseline probit model, an individual’s preference for one of the six
macroeconomic policies (Policy) is regressed on thirteen characteristics that have been
shown to correlate with macroeconomics preferences in prior studies. The independent
variables will predict the likelihood that an individual will support, for example, limiting
CEO pay. Following Walstad (1997), these regressions will include only one economic
education variable, Econliteracy, which is the number of correct answers on the
economics quiz.52 I will also analyze the marginal effects, which provide interpretable
results.
Taking an economics course does not guarantee an infusion of economics
knowledge, but may still influence policy preferences. In the second set of regression, I
maintain a model description similar to Walstad’s (1997) but include Econcourses, which
is the self-reported quantity of college economics courses taken. The third regression
utilizes a dummy variable for taking high school economics, HSecon. While regressions
52

The quantity of correct answers was used rather than the percent answered correctly due to the
relative ease of interpreting marginal effects.
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one, two, and three allow for comparisons with Walstad (1997), they ignore the
possibility that all three economic education variables could be simultaneously relevant.
The fourth set of regressions addresses the question, “Does economics course-taking
correlate with macroeconomic preferences, even when controlling for economics
literacy?” That is, does economic education exert an effect on macroeconomic
preferences that is independent of economics literacy? This is an important question that
has not been addressed by prior researchers.
My analysis diverts significantly from Walstad (1997) in the fifth set of
regressions. In these regressions, I include two new variables. Businesscourses is the
self-reported number of college business courses taken, while HSbusiness is a dummy
variable for taking high school business. Results from these regressions will be used to
gauge whether economics and business courses exert disparate effects on macroeconomic
preferences.
While Walstad (1997) found a correlation between economics literacy and
macroeconomic preferences, there is not adequate evidence to predict the directional
effect of economics course-taking or knowledge. Thus, subsequent tests for significance
of Econliteracy will be two-tailed in each regression.
3.6 Results
The results in Table 3.7 show that economics literacy (as proxied by the number
of correct answers on the seven question quiz) is significantly correlated with
macroeconomic preferences for three of the six policies. Support for maintaining low
interest rates (Lowrates), increased government spending (Govtspend), and increased
bank and Wall Street regulation (Regulatebanks) is not significantly correlated with
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Econliteracy. However, Econliteracy is significantly and positively correlated with
Cuttaxes—the number of correct answers on the seven question economics quiz is
positively correlated with support for a decrease in taxes on businesses aimed to stimulate
the economy. Furthermore, Econliteracy is also positively correlated with support for a
smaller government (Privatemarket) and inversely correlated with support for placing a
threshold on CEO salaries (LimitCEO).
Few of the other independent variables exhibit consistent correlations with policy
preferences. In fact, coefficients for Age, Male, Collgrad, HSgrad, Independent, and the
three income controls are not statistically significant in any of the regressions. White is
positively correlated with Privatemarket and inversely related to Govtspend and
Regulatebanks. Not surprisingly, Republican is inversely correlated with support for
government restrictions—Regulatebanks and LimitCEO—and positively correlated with
Privatemarket. Attending post graduate school is positively correlated with Govtspend.
This result is congruent with 2008 election figures, in which President Obama enjoyed an
18% advantage over McCain among voters with a graduate degree (Teixeira 2010, p.
22).53 Postgrad is also significant and positively correlated with Regulatebanks.
Marginal effects are provided in Table 3.8 to allow for interpretations. For each
marginal effect, all other variables are held at their medians. By evaluating at the
median, the marginal effects display the predicted effect of a slight variable change to the
most typical survey respondent.54 For dummy variables, the coefficient reveals the
increase in the likelihood to support a policy as the dummy variable changes from zero to
53

Postgraduate attendees may support a higher level of government spending because of their
democratic leaning and/or because they trust that their preferred candidate will help spend government
funds in a desirable manner.
54
I have also analyzed the marginal effects while holding all other variables at their means and compared
the results. There were only small differences among regression results.
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one. For example, being white (as opposed to a member of any other race) is correlated
with an 8.7% decrease in the likelihood of supporting a decrease in government spending
during the financial crisis. Being white is also very highly correlated with
Privatemarket—being white is associated with a 16.3% increase in supporting decreased
government action. Individuals with a post-graduate education are 18.7% and 20.6%
more likely than high school dropouts (the omitted variable) to support Govtspend and
Regulatebanks, respectively. Those who have partially completed some college training
are 16.3% more likely to agree with Privatemarket.
Continuous variables (Age, Republican, Independent, and Econliteracy) are
evaluated at the median and indicate the effect of a one unit change. A one-unit increase
in Republican is associated with a 0.5% and 0.6% decrease in support for Lowrates and
Regulatebanks.55 A one-unit increase (from three to four) in the number of correct
economics answers correlates with a 9.2% decrease in the likelihood of supporting a
salary cap for CEOs. A one correct answer increase is associated with a 5.6% and 6.8%
increase in supporting Cuttaxes and Privatemarket, respectively.
A comparison of the findings of Walstad (1997) and my current research are
provided in Table 3.9, which reports the percentage of models in which each variable was
found to be significant at the 0.05 perfect level of significance in the two studies. There
is a great deal of disparity between Walstad’s (1997) results and my own. For example,
Walstad found that Age was significant in three of five models and that the income
controls were significant in at least one model each, while I find no significance for Age
or income. The only consistent finding in the two studies is that Econliteracy is the most

55

As the percentage of state residents voting republican during the last five presidential elections rises
from (the median) 45.77% to 46.77%, the likelihood of supporting Lowrates increases by 0.5%.
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frequently relevant variable. Walstad (1997) found that economics was significant in all
five cases and was “more important and more consistently influential than other personal
characteristics such as age, sex, race, education, income, or political party” (p. 203).
While I only find Econliteracy to be relevant in support for three of the six policies
proposed, my regression results indicate that economic literacy is indeed a major
determinant of macroeconomic policy preferences and certainly more influential than
age, sex, race, or income-level.
In Table 3.10, Econliteracy is replaced by Econcourses. I find that college
economics course-taking is positively correlated to support for reduced federal taxes and
a diminished role of government. Econcourses is not significantly correlated with
Lowrates, Govtspend, Regulatebanks, or LimitCEO. As expected, coefficients and
significance for control variables do not greatly differ from those found in Table 3.7.
Table 3.11 reports the marginal effects. Since the median number of college economics
courses is zero, the marginal effects for Econliteracy indicate the percentage change in
support for the proposed policies as the number of economics courses increases from zero
to one. Taking one, relative to zero, economics course is correlated with a 2.1% and
2.0% increase in support for Cuttaxes and Privatemarket, respectively.
In Table 3.12, HSecon is the independent variable of interest. HSecon proves
significant in one of the six models—high school economics is positively related to
support for a diminished role of government. While the interpretation of these results is
debatable, it could be a result of teaching the principles of the “invisible hand,” which is
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included in the Council for Economic Education standards for high school education.56
This result is surprising considering that some researchers (for example, Shipley & Shetty
2008; Mandell & Klein; Walstad & Rebeck 2001) have found that the completion of high
school economics does not improve future economics knowledge. While my finding
does not necessarily indicate that high school economics is enhancing lifelong economics
literacy, it does suggest that high school economics can have lasting effects. Table 3.13
reports the marginal effects. Taking at least one high school economics course is
associated with a 9.2% increase in the likelihood of supporting a reduction in the role of
government. Because high school economics is often required for students, it is less
likely that selection bias is a concern for these results compared with results from other
regressions.
Next, I include all three economics education variables to get a better grasp on the
relationships between economics education and macroeconomic preferences. It is
possible, for example, that the significant findings in two of the six regressions for
Econcourses is merely driven by high economic literacy rates. In other words,
individuals who take college economics gain economic knowledge, which influences
preferences. When comparing individuals with similar economic literacy, does college
economics still correlate with macroeconomic preferences? As can be seen in Table
3.14, the economic education variables maintain a similar degree of significance even
when all three variables are included. Because the economics education variables are
correlated, one would expect that the inclusion of all three variables would weaken the

56

For example, see National Council on Economic Education (Date Unknown) and National Economics
Challenge (2011).
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apparent significance of these variables in predicting macroeconomic preferences.57
When comparing the results in Table 3.14 to the prior models, only small differences
emerge. As expected, the coefficients and t-values for the economics education variables
are slightly weakened in most cases. Each of the economics education variables are
shown to positively correlate with Privatemarket. Both Econliteracy and Econcourses
are positively correlated with support for Cuttaxes. Finally, Econliteracy is found to be
inversely correlated with LimitCEO. By comparing these findings with earlier models,
one finds that each economics training variable that is significant in the condensed
models maintains its significance in the expanded model. This suggests that economics
literacy, economics course-taking in college, and completion of high school economics
can exert independent effects on policy preferences. For example, when comparing two
individuals with identical economics literacy, it is shown that the individual who has
taken more college economics courses was more likely to support decreasing Federal
taxes (Cuttaxes).
The marginal effects are presented in Table 3.15. A one unit increase in correct
answers on the economics quiz (from 3 to 4) is associated with a 1.9% increase in
supporting Cuttaxes, a 1.8% increase in agreeing with Privatemarket, and a 3.0%
decrease in supporting LimitCEO. Taking one college economics course instead of zero
is associated with a 1.9% and 1.5% increase in the likelihood of supporting Cuttaxes and
Privatemarket, respectively. Finally, taking an economics course leads to a 7.4%
increase in the likelihood one supports Privatemarket. While the significance of these
variables is unchanged (at the 0.05% significance level), the marginal effects for each
57

The simple correlations between economics education variables are: (1) Econliteracy and Econcourses:
0.204, (2) Econliteracy and HSecon: 0.002, and (3) Econcourses and HSecon: 0.111.
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economics training variable are weakened when all three variables are included
simultaneously.
From the regressions provided thus far, it is clear that economics training is
correlated with policy preferences in some cases. However, it is possible that training in
other business courses may influence policy preferences in a similar manner. That is, the
effect of economics course taking may not be unique. There has been some research that
indicates that students taking economics and business classes tend to have similar
political and macroeconomic beliefs. For example, Allgood et at. (2010) found that the
political identification and activity of economics and business majors are quite similar.
While economics and business majors differ in terms of economic preferences for many
policies, economics majors are found to have more in common with business majors than
students of other majors.
Table 3.16 reports the findings when Businesscourses and HSbusiness are
included in the probit regressions, along with the three economics training variables.
Businesscourses and HSbusiness are not found to be significant in any of the probit
regressions. Additionally, coefficients and t-scores are only minimally altered when the
business education variables are included. While I cannot infer that economics training is
unique in influencing macroeconomics preferences, the results in Table 3.16 do suggest
that economics courses influence preferences to a degree that is not replicated by
business courses. The marginal effects, presented in Table 3.17, do not greatly differ
from those in Table 3.15.
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Collectively, the results of the regressions presented thus far suggest that
economic literacy is a strong predictor of support for many macroeconomic preferences.
In fact, no other variable is found to be significant more often than Econliteracy.
Collegiate economics course-taking seems to be a relevant determinant of support for
decreasing taxes on business and a smaller role of government, but is irrelevant in the
other four proposed policies. HSecon is only significant in determining preferences for
Privatemarket.
3.7 Conclusions
While Walstad (1997) found that economics knowledge was relevant in
determining preferences for five out of five proposed policies, I find economics literacy
correlates with preferences in three of six cases.58 I do not think this is an indication that
economics literacy is losing relevance. Instead, I believe this is a result of the specific
policies studied in these papers. While Walstad (1997) intentionally analyzed policies for
which a clear mainstream economic belief had been established, the policies analyzed in
my paper include arguably the six most pertinent macroeconomic issues during the
financial crisis, without considering the preferences of economists. For this reason, I
believe that my paper provides an unbiased analysis of the effects of economics literacy
on macroeconomic preferences. The overall finding is clear-cut: During the financial
crisis, economics literacy was correlated with preferences for some policies, but certainly
not all. More research is needed to determine if such relationships are causal or indirect.

58

Interestingly, Econliteracy was also found to be marginally significant in the model predicting
Regulatebanks when the economics course-taking variables are included. However, in the specification
replicating Walstad’s regressions, Econliteracy is significant in only three of six cases.
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In addition, I find that collegiate economics course-taking is relevant in
determining preferences in two of six cases. It is positively correlated with support for
reducing federal taxes (Cuttaxes) and for reducing the overall role of government
(Privatemarket). I find that high school economics is also positively correlated with
Privatemarket, but is not significant in other models. Economics course-taking is found
significant even when controlling for economics literacy. This novel result suggests that
there may be independent effects of economics course-taking and economics literacy.
However, these findings could be driven by selection issues rather than a causal
relationship between economics education and macroeconomic preferences.
Since policy preferences from the general public influence governance (Burstein
2003; Stimson et al. 1995; Page & Shapiro 1983), it seems reasonable to infer that the
spread of economics education in U.S. high schools and colleges may affect policy.
Admittedly, more research is needed to analyze the degree of causality before any
conclusive claims can be made. Furthermore, the results of this paper indicate that
models searching for the determinants of public preferences may be misspecified if
measures of economics literacy and economics course-taking are not included as
independent variables. While further investigation is needed to extend the scope beyond
the six proposals provided in this paper, these results indicate that economics education
variables are indeed relevant determinants of macroeconomic preferences for some
governmental policies.
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Table 3.1
Dependent variables for probit regressions in Walstad (1997, p. 200)
Description

Mean

Federal Reserve should set monetary policy
(1 = yes; 0 = no or other response)
Reduce federal budget deficit by increasing taxes on business
(1 = no; 0 = yes or other response)
Encourage economic growth by increasing government spending to provide jobs
(1 = no; 0 = yes or other response)
U.S. government should prohibit an increase in oil and gas prices, if the supply of oil
is reduced by a crisis in the Middle East
(1 = no; 0 = yes or other response)
Limit imports from other countries to reduce a trade deficit
(1 = no; 0 = yes or other response)
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0.232
0.587
0.317

0.340

0.321

Table 3.2
Dependent variables for probit regressions
" U.S. policymakers have taken a number of steps to solve the current financial crisis. We
are interested in what you believe would be or would have been solutions to the financial
crisis. In your opinion, which of the following must policymakers do to solve this financial
crisis?" (Select all that apply)

Maintain low interest rates (Lowrates )
Increase government spending to stimulate the
economy (Govtspend )
Reduce federal taxes to stimulate the economy
(Cuttaxes )
Reduce the role of government so the private sector
can rebound on its own (Privatemarket )
Increase government regulation on banks and Wall
Street (Regulatebanks )
Place a limit on CEO pay (LimitCEO )
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Yes

No

473 (35.2%)

872 (64.8%)

203 (15.1%)

1142 (84.9%)

476 (35.4%)

869 (64.6%)

507 (37.7%)

838 (62.3%)

551 (41.0%)

794 (59.0%)

544 (40.4%)

801 (59.6%)

Table 3.3
College economics course taking
Number of Courses
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 or more
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Economics
57.4%
12.3%
14.4%
6.4%
4.5%
1.8%
3.3%

Table 3.4
Economics quiz questions and responses
1) Economic growth is measured by a change in which of the following?
a) The money supply (8.8%)
b) The producer price index (7.8%)
c) The gross domestic product (45.6%)
d) The balance of payments (9.7%)
2) There is a deficit in the Federal Budget when:
b) US imports are greater than US
a) Government spending is greater than
exports (10.3%)
tax revenues (49.7%)
c) Demand for money is greater than total
d) Don't know/not sure (16.3%)
money supply (23.7%)
3) Who sets monetary policy in the U.S.?
a) The president (5.1%)
c) The Federal Reserve (43.5%)
e) Don't know/not sure (16.8%)

b) Congress (23.7%)
d) The U.S. Treasury (10.9%)

4) Which of the following is an example of fiscal policy? Would you say a change in:
a) Federal income tax rates (23.9%)
b) The discount rate (9.4%)
c) The prime rate (39.2%)
d) Don't know/not sure (27.4%)
5) Which of the following is most likely to improve the wages of American workers?
Would you say an increase in:
a) Stock market prices (6.7%)
b) Business inventories (9.4%)
c) Productivity (54.6%)
d) Interest rates (13.4%)
e) Don't know/not sure (15.9%)
6) The purchasing power of people's income is most affected by the:
a) Inflation rate (55.8%)
b) Trade deficit (11.9%)
c) Balance of payments (15.9%)
d) Don't know/not sure (16.2%)
7) The prices of most products in a competitive market are determined by:
a) The government (3.1%)
b) Business monopolies (13.8%)
c) Supply and demand (62.4%)
d) The consumer price index (9.0%)
e) Don't know/not sure (11.2%)
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Table 3.5
Economics quiz results
Number of questions
answered correctly
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Percentage of
respondents
7.9%
12.0%
13.5%
19.0%
18.5%
16.7%
9.2%
3.0%

Table 3.6
Variable definitions and means
Variable
Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican

Independent
Econliteracy
Econcourses
HSecon

Definition
Age, in years
1 if male
1 if white
1 if earned graduate degree(s)
1 if college graduate, but did not earn graduate degree
1 if completed some college, but did not earn degree
1 if completed high school, but did not attend college
I if household income exceeds $100,000
1 if household income is between $60,000 and $100,000
1 if household income is between $20,000 and $60,000
Percent of popular vote for Republican candidate in
respondent's state of residence averaged over the last five
presidential elections
Percent of popular vote for neither Republican nor
Democrat candidate in respondent's state of residence
averaged over the last five presidential elections
# of correct questions on economics quiz (out of 7)
# of economics courses taken in undergrad
1 if respondent took high school economics course
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Mean
54.32
0.42
0.84
0.16
0.34
0.18
0.25
0.20
0.27
0.41

Min
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
97
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

45.80

8.65

59.74

6.95

3.92

13.20

3.30
1.20
0.45

0
0
0

7
17
1

Table 3.7
Variable of interest: Econliteracy

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
Econlitearcy
Constant
Chi-square

LowRates
GovtSpend
-0.000 (0.10)
-0.000 (0.01)
-0.051 (0.67)
-0.033 (0.36)
-0.037 (0.35) -0.346 (2.87)**
-0.004 (0.02) 0.683 (2.74)**
0.116 (0.63)
0.238 (1.01)
0.090 (0.47)
0.152 (0.62)
0.094 (0.52)
0.283 (1.22)
-0.001 (0.01)
-0.198 (1.07)
0.679 (0.47)
-0.225 (1.34)
0.081 (0.62)
-0.265(1.73)
-0.013 (1.98)*
-0.005 (0.60)
0.368 (1.55)
0.012 (0.43)
-0.023 (0.97)
0.004 (0.15)
0.425 (0.97)
9.30

CutTaxes
0.004 (1.35)
0.042 (0.54)
-0.081 (0.76)
-0.211 (1.02)
0.115 (0.62)
-0.017 (0.09)
0.123 (0.67)
0.150 (0.93)
0.207 (1.40)
0.089 (0.67)
-0.002 (0.30)
-0.036 (1.52)
0.056 (2.34)*

-2.071 (3.40)**
221.64**

PrivateMarket
RegulateBanks
LimitCEO
0.003 (1.04)
0.004 (1.33)
-0.028 (1.10)
0.078 (1.01)
-0.012 (0.16)
0.092 (1.22)
0.478 (4.13)** -0.179 (1.71)
-0.034 (0.33)
0.014 (0.06)
0.525 (2.60)**
0.280 (1.42)
0.290 (1.48)
0.259 (1.40)
0.144 (0.80)
0.423 (2.11)*
0.116 (0.60)
0.169 (0.91)
0.246 (1.27)
0.077 (0.42)
0.151 (0.85)
0.212 (1.34)
-0.012 (0.08)
-0.112 (0.71)
0.178 (1.20)
0.191 (1.31)
0.133 (0.93)
0.079 (0.59)
0.234 (1.76)
0.162 (1.26)
0.011 (1.68) -0.016 (2.58)** -0.012 (1.88)
0.013 (0.57)
-0.007 (2.32)*
-0.018 (0.79)
0.068 (2.82)**
0.025 (1.07) -0.092 (3.88)**

-0.593 (1.35) -1.957 (4.38)**
21.67
59.98**
n = 1,182
*Significant at 0.05 (two-tailed test)
**Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed test)
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-0.017 (0.04)
39.30**

0.575 (1.34)
40.69**

Table 3.8
Marginal effects (variable of interest: Econliteracy)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
Econcourses

LowRates
-0.000
-0.019
-0.014
-0.002
0.043
0.033
0.035
0.000
0.025
0.030
-0.005*
-0.013
-0.008

GovtSpend
CutTaxes
PrivateMarket
-0.000
0.001
0.001
-0.007
0.015
0.029
-0.087**
-0.030
0.163**
0.187**
-0.074
0.005
0.055
0.042
0.109
0.036
-0.006
0.163*
0.068
0.045
0.093
-0.041
0.055
0.082
-0.047
0.076
0.067
-0.057
0.032
0.030
-0.001
-0.001
0.004
0.003
-0.013
-0.005
0.001
0.020*
0.025**
*Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
**Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed test)
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RegulateBanks
0.001
-0.004
-0.070
0.206
0.101
0.045
0.030
-0.005
0.074
0.090
-0.006**
-0.000
-0.010

LimitCEO
-0.001
0.035
-0.013
0.109
0.055
0.065
0.058
-0.042
0.051
0.062
-0.004
-0.007
-0.036**

Table 3.9
Variable significance comparison
Variable
Walstad (1997)
Evans
Age
40%
0%
Male
60%
0%
White
20%
33%
Postgrad
20%
33%
Collgrad
0%
0%
Somecoll
0%
17%
HSgrad
0%
0%
Upperincome
40%
0%
Upmidincome
20%
0%
Midincome
20%
0%
Republican*
60%
33%
Independent*
60%
17%
Econliteracy
100%
50%
*Description of Republican and Independent greatly
differ in the two papers
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Table 3.10
Probit model (variable of interest: Econcourses)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
Econcourses
Constant
Chi-square

LowRates
GovtSpend
CutTaxes
-0.001 (0.21)
0.000 (0.10)
0.002 (0.86)
-0.031 (0.39)
-0.035 (0.37)
0.022 (0.27)
-0.094 (0.86) -0.377 (3.09)** -0.057 (0.52)
-0.033 (0.16) 0.612 (2.73)** -0.293 (1.40)
0.041 (0.22)
0.254 (1.07)
0.021 (0.11)
0.070 (0.36)
0.158 (0.63)
-0.042 (0.21)
0.102 (0.56)
0.283 (1.26)
0.137 (0.74)
-0.040 (0.25)
-0.193 (1.06)
0.227 (1.40)
-0.001 (0.01)
-0.236 (1.41)
0.260 (1.76)
0.47 (0.36)
-0.275 (1.80)
0.097 (0.72)
-0.013 (1.99)*
-0.004 (0.47)
-0.002 (0.31)
-0.039 (1.60)
0.014 (0.48)
-0.023 (0.95)
0.008 (0.39)
0.017 (0.78)
0.062 (3.17)**
0.504 (1.10)
8.54

-0.792 (1.45)
31.73**

PrivateMarket
0.001 (0.23)
0.102 (1.27)
0.482 (4.06)**
-0.046 (0.21)
0.237 (1.20)
0.374 (1.84)
0.254 (1.32)
0.315 (1.95)
0.253 (1.71)
0.132 (0.97)
0.011 (1.68)
-0.013 (0.55)
0.056 (2.88)**

-0.512 (1.12) -1.759 (3.81)**
23.93*
52.66**
n = 1,102
*Significant at 0.05 level
**Significant at 0.01 level
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RegulateBanks
0.005 (1.63)
-0.006 (0.08)
-0.205 (1.90)
0.576 (2.83)**
0.309 (1.64)
0.157 (0.80)
0.092 (0.50)
0.014 (0.09)
0.202 (1.40)
0.232 (1.75)
-0.015 (2.29)*
0.005 (0.20)
0.001 (0.07)

LimitCEO
-0.003 (1.10)
0.107 (1.36)
-0.072 (0.67)
0.172 (0.86)
0.102 (0.55)
0.073 (0.38)
0.140 (0.79)
-0.264 (1.68)
-0.015 (0.10)
0.069 (0.53)
-0.010 (1.57)
-0.011 (0.48)
-0.19 (0.98)

-0.102 (0.23)
37.18**

0.362 (0.82)
17.07

Table 3.11
Marginal effects (variable of interest: Econcourses)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
Econcourses

LowRates
-0.000
-0.012
-0.034
-0.012
0.015
0.026
0.038
-0.015
-0.000
0.017
-0.005*
-0.014
0.003

GovtSpend
0.000
-0.006
-0.069**
0.125*
0.047
0.029
0.054
-0.035
-0.043
-0.050
-0.001
0.003
0.003

CutTaxes
PrivateMarket
0.001
0.000
0.007
0.037
-0.019
0.173**
-0.099
-0.017
0.007
0.085
-0.014
0.134
0.046
0.091
0.077
0.113*
0.088
0.091
0.033
0.047
-0.001
0.004
-0.008
-0.005
0.021**
0.020**
*Significant at 0.05 level
**Significant at 0.01 level
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RegulateBanks
0.002
-0.002
-0.081
0.226**
0.121
0.062
0.036
0.005
0.079
0.091
-0.006*
0.002
0.001

LimitCEO
-0.001
0.042
-0.028
0.067
0.039
0.028
0.054
-0.102
-0.006
0.027
-0.004
-0.004
-0.008

Table 3.12
Probit results (variable of interest: HSecon)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
HSecon
Constant
Chi-square

LowRates
GovtSpend
0.001 (0.21)
-0.001 (0.40)
-0.075 (0.94)
-0.031 (0.32)
-0.069 (0.63) -0.352 (2.83)**
-0.096 (0.43) 0.938 (3.11)**
0.020 (0.09)
0.493 (1.70)
-0.019 (0.09)
0.268 (0.89)
0.033 (0.16)
0.546 (1.89)
-0.016 (0.10)
-0.302 (1.62)
0.027 (0.18)
-0.327 (1.91)
0.087 (0.63)
-0.377 (2.36)*
-0.015 (2.22)*
-0.005 (0.57)
-0.037 (1.51)
0.021 (0.71)
0.009 (0.11)
-0.052 (0.53)
0.549 (1.18)
9.58

CutTaxes
0.004 (1.40)
0.013 (0.16)
-0.062 (0.55)
-0.129 (0.55)
0.188 (0.87)
0.042 (0.19)
0.167 (0.77)
0.240 (1.45)
0.304 (2.01)*
0.144 (1.02)
-0.001 (0.12)
-0.027 (1.10)
-0.027 (0.34)

RegulateBanks
0.003 (1.16)
-0.020 (0.26)
-0.161 (1.48)
0.326 (1.46)
0.095 (0.46)
-0.060 (0.28)
-0.158 (0.76)
0.045 (0.28)
0.218 (1.46)
0.257 (1.86)
-0.016 (2.44)*
-0.010 (0.40)
-0.052 (0.66)

LimitCEO
-0.003 (1.00)
0.107 (1.37)
-0.098 (0.91)
0.031 (0.14)
0.048 (0.24)
-0.017 (0.08)
0.036 (0.18)
-0.250 (1.57)
-0.012 (0.08)
0.052 (0.39)
-0.012 (1.78)
-0.032 (1.30)
-0.100 (1.25)

-0.654 (1.41) -2.0632 (4.32)** 0.3136 (0.69)
15.80
56.49**
32.62**
n = 1,100
*Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
**Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed test)

0.7197 (1.58)
17.69

-0.8396 (1.46)
37.93**
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PrivateMarket
0.004 (1.47)
0.083 (1.04)
0.519 (4.34)**
0.091 (1.31)
0.307 (1.35)
0.423 (1.82)
0.216 (0.95)
0.285 (1.73)
0.278 (1.83)
0.116 (0.81)
0.009 (1.43)
0.003 (0.10)
0.256 (3.15)**

Table 3.13
Marginal effects (variable of interest: HSecon)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
HSecon

LowRates
0.000
-0.028
-0.026
-0.037
0.007
-0.007
0.012
-0.006
0.010
0.033
-0.006
-0.014
0.004

GovtSpend
-0.000
-0.006
-0.067**
0.180**
0.095
0.051
0.105
-0.058
-0.063
-0.072*
-0.001
0.004
-0.010

CutTaxes
PrivateMarket
0.001
0.001
0.005
0.030
-0.023
0.186**
-0.047
0.017
0.069
0.110
0.015
0.152
0.061
0.078
0.088
0.102
0.112*
0.100
0.053
0.042
-0.000
0.003
-0.010
0.001
-0.010
0.092**
*Significant at 0.05 level
**Significant at 0.01 level
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RegulateBanks
0.001
-0.008
-0.064
0.129
0.380
-0.024
-0.063
0.018
0.086
0.102
-0.006*
-0.004
-0.021

LimitCEO
-0.001
0.041
-0.038
0.012
-0.019
-0.006
0.014
-0.096
-0.005
0.020
-0.004
-0.012
-0.038

Table 3.14
Probit model (variables of interest: all econ)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
Econlitearcy
Econcourses
HSecon
Constant
Chi-square

LowRates
GovtSpend
CutTaxes
-0.000 (0.05)
-0.001 (0.24)
0.003 (1.00)
-0.049 (0.59)
-0.038 (0.39)
-0.011 (0.13)
-0.096 (0.84) -0.378 (2.94)** -0.084 (0.73)
-0.078 (0.34) 0.923 (3.00)** -0.337 (1.40)
-0.016 (0.07)
0.485 (1.64)
-0.016 (0.07)
-0.032 (0.15)
0.269 (0.88)
-0.066 (0.29)
0.44 (0.21)
0.554 (1.92)
0.178 (0.82)
0.040 (0.23)
-0.301 (1.53)
0.125 (0.71)
0.030 (0.19)
-0.344 (1.92)
0.208 (1.30)
0.094 (0.66)
-0.384 (2.35)*
0.054 (0.37)
-0.014 (2.06)*
-0.004 (0.49)
-0.002 (0.26)
-0.038 (1.49)
0.022 (0.71)
-0.021 (0.82)
-0.023 (0.89)
-0.001 (0.03)
0.055 (2.11)*
0.011 (0.53)
0.022 (0.98)
0.057 (2.79)**
0.006 (0.07)
-0.047 (0.46)
-0.044 (0.51)
0.619 (1.29)
9.90

-0.876 (1.49)
38.20**

PrivateMarket
0.002 (0.70)
0.100 (1.20)
0.463 (3.73)**
-0.136 (0.55)
0.145 (0.62)
0.313 (1.32)
0.228 (1.00)
0.201 (1.15)
0.200 (1.24)
0.063 (0.42)
0.010 (1.50)
-0.000 (0.01)
0.053 (2.05)*
0.046 (2.24)*
0.221 (2.60)**

-0.637 (1.32) -2.015 (4.07)**
27.07*
58.13**
n = 1,030
*Significant at 0.05 (two-tailed test)
**Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed test)
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RegulateBanks
LimitCEO
0.005 (1.60)
-0.004 (1.27)
-0.012 (0.14)
0.132 (1.62)
-0.209 (1.85)
-0.071 (0.63)
0.278 (1.22)
0.145 (0.64)
0.053 (0.25)
0.101 (0.48)
-0.087 (0.40)
0.021 (0.10)
-0.153 (0.73)
0.052 (0.26)
-0.0521 (0.31)
-0.153 (0.91)
0.136 (0.87)
0.052 (0.34)
0.196 (1.38)
0.094 (0.68)
-0.015 (2.23)*
-0.020 (1.45)
-0.010 (0.40)
-0.026 (1.05)
0.045 (1.75) -0.076 (2.96)**
0.005 (0.23)
-0.013 (0.64)
-0.032 (0.38)
-0.108 (1.29)
0.170 (0.36)
34.745**

0.747 (1.59)
26.86*

Table 3.15
Marginal effects (variables of interest: all econ)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
Econlitearcy
Econcourses
HSecon

LowRates
-0.000
-0.018
-0.036
-0.029
-0.006
-0.012
0.016
0.015
0.011
0.035
-0.005
-0.014
-0.009
0.004
0.002

GovtSpend
-0.000
-0.007
-0.071**
.0.173*
0.091
0.051
0.104
-0.056
-0.064
-0.072*
-0.001
0.004
-0.000
0.004
-0.009

CutTaxes
PrivateMarket
0.001
0.001
-0.004
0.033
-0.028
0.154**
-0.113
-0.045
-0.005
0.048
-0.022
0.104
0.060
0.076
0.042
0.067
0.070
0.066
0.018
0.021
-0.001
0.003
-0.007
-0.000
0.019*
0.018*
0.019**
0.015*
-0.015
0.074**
*Significant at 0.05 level
**Significant at 0.01 level
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RegulateBanks
0.002
-0.005
-0.082
0.109
0.021
-0.034
-0.060
-0.020
0.054
0.077
-0.006*
-0.004
0.018
0.002
-0.012

LimitCEO
-0.001
0.052
-0.028
0.057
0.040
0.008
0.020
-0.060
0.020
0.037
-0.004
-0.010
-0.030**
-0.005
-0.042

Table 3.16
Probit model (variables of interest: all econ and business)

Age
Male
White
Postgrad
Collgrad
Somecoll
HSgrad
Upperincome
Upmidincome
Midincome
Republican
Independent
Econlitearcy
Econcourses
HSecon
Businesscourses
HSbusiness

LowRates
-0.001 (0.26)
-0.046 (0.55)
-0.066 (0.57)
-0.111 (0.47)
-0.096 (0.44)
-0.084 (0.37)
0.002 (0.01)
0.005 (0.03)
-0.005 (0.03)
0.057 (0.40)
-0.013 (1.91)
-0.033 (1.27)
-0.026 (0.97)
-0.008 (0.35)
-0.023 (0.25)
0.025 (1.74)
0.047 (0.50)

GovtSpend
-0.001 (0.42)
-0.034 (0.34)
-0.364 (2.78)**
0.938 (3.02)**
0.511 (1.70)
0.271 (0.78)
0.566 (1.93)
-0.312 (1.58)
-0.321 (1.78)
-0.389 (2.36)*
-0.001 (0.09)
0.024 (0.78)
-0.002 (0.07)
0.049 (1.84)
0.012 (0.11)
-0.0208 (1.16)
-0.161 (1.37)

Constant
Chi-square

0.623 (1.28)
10.75

-0.987 (1.66)
40.75**

CutTaxes
0.003 (0.82)
0.007 (0.08)
-0.074 (0.63)
-0.325 (1.32)
-0.032 (0.14)
-0.057 (0.24)
0.208 (0.94)
0.113 (0.64)
0.232 (1.44)
0.041 (0.27)
0.000 (0.06)
-0.017 (0.66)
0.053 (2.00)*
0.057 (2.41)*
-0.074 (0.78)
0.011 (0.75)
0.054 (1.58)

PrivateMarket
0.002 (0.57)
0.089 (1.04)
0.442 (3.50)**
-0.115 (0.45)
0.212 (0.88)
0.333 (1.35)
0.279 (1.19)
0.207 (1.17)
0.165 (1.01)
0.055 (0.37)
0.011 (1.53)
0.003 (0.13)
0.061 (2.30)*
0.064 (2.65)**
0.199 (2.12)*
-0.018 (1.22)
0.049 (0.51)

-0.779 (1.58) -2.086 (4.13)**
30.92*
53.43**
n = 1,001
*Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
**Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed test)
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RegulateBanks
0.004 (1.50)
-0.015 (0.18)
-0.219 (1.91)
0.308 (1.33)
0.063 (0.29)
-0.065 (0.29)
-0.137 (0.64)
-0.010 (0.06)
0.196 (1.24)
0.216 (1.50)
-0.013 (1.89)
-0.005 (0.18)
0.041 (1.56)
0.003 (0.11)
-0.010 (0.11)
0.003 (0.19)
-0.059 (0.63)

LimitCEO
-0.004 (1.20)
0.128 (1.55)
-0.088 (0.77)
0.101 (0.44)
0.087 (0.41)
-0.037 (0.17)
0.001 (0.01)
-0.157 (0.93)
0.050 (0.32)
0.067 (0.48)
-0.009 (1.25)
-0.024 (0.96)
-0.075 (2.86)**
-0.017 (0.71)
-0.109 (1.18)
-0.005 (0.37)
0.44 (0.46)

0.036 (0.08)
34.34**

0.733 (1.54)
26.28

Table 3.17
Marginal effects (variables of interest: all econ and business)

Age
Male
White
PostGrad
CollGrad
SomeColl
HSGrad
UpperIncome
UpMidIncome
MidIncome
Republican
Independent
EconLitearcy
EconCourses
HSEcon
BusinessCourses
HSBusiness

LowRates
-0.000
-0.017
-0.024
-0.040
-0.035
-0.031
0.001
0.002
-0.002
0.021
-0.005
-0.012
-0.009
-0.003
-0.008
0.009
0.017

GovtSpend
CutTaxes
PrivateMarket
-0.000
0.001
0.001
-0.007
0.002
0.030
-0.072**
-0.024
0.149**
0.185*
-0.105
-0.038
0.101
-0.010
0.071
0.054
-0.018
0.112
0.112
0.067
0.094
-0.062
0.036
0.070
-0.063
0.075
0.055
-0.077*
0.013
0.018
-0.000
0.000
0.004
0.005
-0.006
0.001
-0.000
0.017*
0.021*
0.010
0.018*
0.021**
0.002
-0.024
0.067*
-0.004
0.003
-0.006
-0.032
0.017
0.017
*Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
**Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed test)
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RegulateBanks
0.002
-0.006
-0.086
0.121
0.025
-0.026
-0.054
-0.004
0.077
0.085
-0.005
-0.002
0.016
0.001
-0.004
0.001
-0.023

LimitCEO
-0.001
0.050
-0.034
0.040
0.034
-0.014
0.001
-0.062
0.020
0.026
-0.003
-0.009
-0.029**
-0.007
-0.043
-0.002
0.017
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